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SUBSIDIZED RENTAL PROJECTS IN DEFAULT:
RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Alan S. Ganz*
Marc A. Primack**
When a government subsidized multi-family housing project is in
default, the rights and remedies of the parties differ greatly from
those when a traditionally financed project is in default. Not only
are governmental parties involved -possibly a state entity as well
as the Department of Housing and Urban Development -but the
legal relationships of the mortgagor and mortgagee are more com-
plex due to the existence of contractual relationships supplemental
to the mortgage agreement, state and federal statutes, and court
decisions unique to subsidized housing. The authors examine the
practical considerations arising from the various legal relationships
and discuss the options of both state housing finance agencies and
project owners when subsidized projects are in default.
Federally subsidized multi-family housing has become an important part of
the nation's housing stock.' The subsidies are administered by the United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) under the
provisions of section 8 of the United States Housing Act of 19372 (section 8),
section 101 of the Housing and Urban Development Act of 1965 3 (section
101) and section 236 of the National Housing Act 4 (section 236). The extent
of federal spending in this area is reflected by the amounts HUD committed
during fiscal 1980. During that period, HUD paid $271,197,000 in rent sup-
plements, $2,104,220,000 under section 8, and $656,053,000 under section
236. 5 As of September 30, 1979, HUD had paid subsidies for 7500 projects
* B.A., Wabash College (1954); LL.B., Harvard University (1959).
** B.A., University of Chicago (1973); J.D., Stanford University (1977).
The authors' Chicago law firm is outside counsel for the Illinois Housing Development Au-
thority. They gratefully acknowledge the help of Director Donald W. Hoaglund and Assistant
Director and General Counsel Robert J. Wittebort, Jr.
1. One study conducted in 1970 found that 19.3% of rental housing in Chicago was feder-
ally subsidized, 16.0% in New York, and 19.9% in Atlanta. See D. MANDELKER & R.
MONTGOMERY, HOUSING IN AMERICA: PROBLEMS & PERSPECTIVES 342 (1973). Doubtless, since
1970 the percentage of the housing stock subsidized by federal largess has risen significantly.
2. Ch. 896, § 8, 50 Stat. 891 (1937) (section 8 was added by the Housing and Community
Development Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-383, § 201(a), 88 Stat. 662 (1974)) (as amended)
(currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976)). See 24 C.F.R. §§ 883.101-.713, 884.101-225
(1980).
3. Pub. L. No. 89-117, § 101(a)-(e), (g), (h), (j), 79 Stat. 451 (1965) (as amended) (currently
codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1701s (1976)). See 24 C.F.R. §§ 215.1-.80, 236.1-.915 (1980).
4. Ch. 847, § 236, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (section 236 was added by Housing and Urban
Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 201(a), 82 Stat. 498 (1968)) (as amended)
(currently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976)). See 24 C.F.R. §§ 236.1-.915 (1980).
5. Letter from Charles Patterson, Housing Information Coordinator, HUD, to Alan S.
Ganz (Nov. 19, 1980).
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under regulatory agreements. 6 These projects contained approximately
786,600 residential units. 7
Some of the subsidies authorized by these acts are channeled through
state housing finance agencies (HFAs). s These state bodies are, however,
more than mere conduits for rent subsidies. HFAs also help finance pri-
vately owned housing projects with funds obtained by issuing revenue bonds
secured by first mortgages. 9 At the present time, approximately thirty
HFAs are financing such privately owned multi-family projects. These proj-
ects comprise over 292,000 units with an outstanding indebtedness of ap-
proximately $9 billion. 10
Subsidized financing of privately owned projects imposes legal duties upon
owners not present with traditional financing. In addition to the obligations
undertaken by the owner of a traditionally financed multi-family project
through the mortgage, mortgage note and assignment of rents, the owner of
subsidized housing incurs duties under a regulatory agreement entered into
with HUD," an HFA, 1 2 or both. Whereas traditionally an owner is free to
rent to whom he or she pleases and to use project income in any manner as
long as debt service is paid and waste is not committed, the owner receiving
subsidies is restricted by provisions limiting the types of tenants, usually in
terms of income, who may live in the project,' 3 the owner's economic re-
turn, 14 and the use of project income.' 5
Although HUD and HFA mortgages and notes never place personal liabil-
ity for payment of the debt upon the owner, regulatory agreements typically
hold the owner responsible for any misapplication of funds. 16 Thus, if an
owner defaults, 17 HUD or the HFA may be able to foreclose on the
6. See notes 11-15 and accompanying text infra.
7. Letter from Marilyn Melkonian, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Multi-family Housing Pro-
grams, HUD, to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 28, 1979).
8. See 42 U.S.C. 1437fb) (1976) (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to enter into "contribu-
tion contracts" with state public housing agencies to make assistance payments to owners of low
income dwelling units).
9. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 314 (1979) (authorizing Illinois Housing De-
velopment Authority to issue negotiable revenue bonds and notes to achieve its purposes, inter
alia, "making of mortgage or other loans for the construction of housing to be occupied by low
and moderate income persons" and "rehabilitation of existing structures so occupied").
10. See State Statute and Size Chart, Appendix A infra.
11. See, e.g., FHA Form No. 3136 (revised Sept. 1969) ("Regulatory Agreement for Limited
Distribution Mortgagors tinder Section 236 of the National Housing Act, as amended").
12. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A) (revised Aug. 1975) (Illinois Housing Development
Authority's "Regulatory Agreement (Limited-Profit Rental)") [hereinafter cited as IHDA Form
No. LD-5(A)].
13. Id. 8 (c), (d).
14. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 308 (1979). See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 10(l)(1).
15. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 10, 13.
16. Id. 4(b).
17. Throughout this Article the term default will include both default under the mortgage
and breach of the regulatory agreement. Although there is a technical difference between the
two, regulatory agreements generally contain an acceleration clause that permits the HFA to
declare a default upon breach of the agreement. Thus, the practical effects of breach of the
1026 [Vol. 29:1025
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mortgage as well as bring suit for violation of the regulatory agreement.
Upon breach of the agreement, the HFA typically has the rights to acceler-
ate the mortgage, to collect the rents and apply them to the project, to take
possession of the project and to sue for specific performance of the agree-
ment' 8 under traditional equitable principles or pursuant to statute. 19
Default is frequent enough to be a major problem. As of October 31,
1979, HUD has filed 884 actions 20 and HFAs seventeen 2' to acquire title to
subsidized projects. Although HUD has no cumulative statistics as to the
number of suits in which it has brought a cause of action based upon a
regulatory agreement, it is aware of such claims being raised in eight pend-
ing actions. 22  HFAs have filed at least six such suits. 23  Of these, the Il-
linois Housing Development Authority has filed four.24 The purpose of this
Article is to discuss the options of both the HFA and the project owners
when subsidized projects are in default. The Article discusses considerations
agreement are identical to those of a default under the mortgage. See, e.g., IHDA Form No.
LD-5(A), 16. Although there are other possible breaches, such as breaches of construction
contracts, they are outside the scope of this Article. Similarly, this Article will not discuss suits
on construction bonds, tenants' rights, or suits on letters of credit secured by owners. Cf.
Edgewater Constr. Co. v. Wilson Mortgage Corp., 44 Ill. App. 3d 220, 357 N.E.2d 1307 (1st.
Dist. 1976).
18. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 16(a)-(d).
19. Although the Illinois Housing Development Act requires that limited partnership
agreements contain language purporting to grant the Illinois Housing Development Authority
power to appoint a managing partner of the partnership owning a project when default occurs,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 302(k)(2) (1979), and the typical regulatory agreement purports to
give the Illinois Housing Development Authority power to, inter alia, apply to any court for
specific performance of the agreement, see, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 16(d), it was held
in Illinois Hous. Dev. Auth. v. Arbor Trails Dev., 84 I11. App. 3d 97, 103-06, 404 N.E.2d 1097,
1101-04 (3d Dist. 1980), that traditional rules of equity would determine the availability of
injunctive relief for the Authority. In response to Arbor Trails, the Illinois legislature enacted
P.A. 81-1284, 1980 I11. Leg. Serv. 303 (West). Section 1 of P.A. 81-1284 amended § 7.8 of the
Illinois Housing Development Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 307.8 (1979), to provide that
"[u]pon application to a court of proper jurisdiction, injunctive relief shall issue in aid of the
Authority's powers . . .notwithstanding any other provisions of law." The Act took effect July 5,
1980. Thus, today equitable relief can be obtained by the Illinois Housing Development Author-
ity under traditional equitable principles or pursuant to P.A. 81-1284, See notes 166 & 167 and
accompanying text infra.
20. Letter from Marilyn Melkonian, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Multi-Family Housing
Programs, HUD, to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 28, 1979). In addition, about 71% of the approximately
2,000 mortgages held by HUD through assignments after projects had encountered financial
difficulties are currently delinquent. Hearings on Management of HUD's Multi-Family
Properties -The Clifton Terrace Case, Before a Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on Appropria-
tions, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17, 257 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Hearings on Multi-Family Prop-
erties].
21. See Suit Foreclosure Chart, Appendix B infra.
22. Letter from John P. Kennedy, Assistant General Counsel, Multi-family Mortgage Insur-
ance, HUD, to Alan S. Ganz (Dec. 17, 1980). Of these eight actions in which regulatory agree-
ments are involved, two are actions filed by HUD and six are actions in which HUD filed
counterclaims.
23. See Suit Foreclosure Chart, Appendix B infra.
24. Id.
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
arising when there is a simple financial default, a breach of the regulatory
agreement, or both.
THE ROLES OF THE PARTIES
Multi-family subsidized housing is dependent upon the cooperation of
governmental and private parties. In essence the governmental role in creat-
ing subsidized housing is to induce private parties to commit their funds and
efforts toward construction that would not occur with conventional financing
or be paid for with unsubsidized rents. The primary participants in this in-
dustry are: (1) the federal government acting through HUD and federal in-
come tax policies; (2) state governments acting through HFAs; (3) private
entrepreneurs who build the projects; and (4) private investors who purchase
HFA bonds and notes or proprietary interests in projects. Thus, in order to
understand the ramifications of a default, an understanding of the expecta-
tions, functions and liabilities of the primary parties is necessary.
The Governmental Parties
The federal government's commitment to large scale housing projects
dates to the 1930's when legislation was enacted authorizing federal
mortgage insurance 25 and low rent public housing. 26 The continuing goal of
these and subsequent federal housing programs has been to provide "a de-
cent home and a suitable living environment for every American family." 27
This federal purpose has been implemented through a variety of programs
that have employed, either separately or in combination, direct subsidies to
public or private owners, 28 mortgage insurance, 29 and income tax benefits. 30
By 1960, only Pennsylvania and New York had created housing finance
programs. By 1966, other states had enacted legislation creating HFAs. 31
25. National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (currently codified at 12 U.S.C.
§ 17 15z-1 (1976)).
26. United States Housing Act of 1937, ch. 896, 56 Stat. 888 (currently codified at 42
U.S.C. § 1437f (1976)).
27. 42 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976). See also 12 U.S.C. § 1701t (1976).
28. See, e.g., The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82
Stat. 476, 498 (currently codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976)). See generally Committee on
Housing and Urban Development, Subcommittee on State and Local Housing Development
Legislation and Programs, Development of State Housing Finance Agencies, 9 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 471, 474-75 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Development of State HFAs].
Typically, the owner of a subsidized project is a limited partnership of which the developer is
the general partner. Although some projects are owned by not-for-profit corporations, this form
of ownership is not discussed in this Article.
29. See, e.g., National Housing Act, ch. 847, 48 Stat. 1246 (1934) (currently codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1715k(d)(3) (1976)). Special considerations concerning insured HFA mortgages are not
discussed in this Article.
30. See, e.g., I.R.C. § 103 (exempting municipal bond income from federal income taxa-
tion). See note 39 infra.
31. Pennsylvania created its housing finance agency in 1959. 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN.
§§ 1680.101-207 (Purdon 1977). New York followed in 1960. N.Y. PRIV. Hous. FIN. LAW
[Vol. 29:10251028
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These agencies' activities were coordinated with the federal housing pro-
grams by the Housing and Community Development Act of 197432 through
provisions in the Act that allowed qualified HFAs to administer parts of fed-
eral housing programs. 33 The availability of subsidies from the federal gov-
ernment spurred the HFAs to accelerate efforts to mitigate the "serious
shortage of decent, safe, and sanitary housing available at low and moderate
rentals to persons and families of low and moderate income." 34
Typically, HFAs are corporate entities and not part of the state govern-
ment. 35 They generally are minimally dependent upon the tax revenues or
credit of their respective governments to defray operational costs or to se-
cure obligations. 36 HFAs obtain revenues needed to finance multi-family
housing projects by issuing bonds secured by the HFA's assets and by first
mortgages on projects which the bond proceeds are used to finance. 3 7
Further, after a state government has made an initial appropriation to enable
its HFA to commence activities, the operating expenses of the HFA are met
from fees charged mortgagors. 38 Because interest on HFA bonds is not
taxed by the federal government, 39 investors in such bonds accept lower
§§ 40-58 (McKinney 1976). See generally Note, Pennsylvania Housing Finance Agency Act of 1972,
7 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 420 (1974). For a compilation of state statutes, see Development of State
HFAs, supra note 28, at 471 n.2. For current information about the HFAs of the 44 states that
have established such entities, see 3 Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA) 50:1001-:5561.
32. Pub. L. No. 93-383, 88 Stat. 633 (currently codified at 42 U.S.C. § 5301 (1976)).
33. See S. REP. No. 693, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974), reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG.
& AD. NEws 4273.
34. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 303 (1979). See also Hance & Duvall, Coinsurance: The Key
to the Future for State Housing Finance Agencies?, 8 URB. LAW. 720, 721-22 (1976) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Hance & Duvall]; Note, State Housing Finance Agencies: The Iowa Blueprint, 62
IOWA L. REV. 1524, 1526 (1977).
35. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 304 (1979) (Illinois Housing Development Author-
ity is a "body politic and corporate"); N.Y. PRIv. Hous. FIN. LAW § 43.1 (McKinney 1976)
(New York state housing finance agency is a "corporate governmental agency constituting a
public benefit corporation"); 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1680.103 (Purdon 1977) (Pennsylvania
Housing Finance Agency is a "public body, corporate and politic").
36. For example, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 320 (1979) makes it clear that the State of
Illinois is not liable for obligations issued by the Illinois Housing Development Authority; how-
ever, the Illinois statute provides for a legally unenforceable "moral obligation" of the state to
make up any deficiency in funds available to pay the principal and interest on Illinois Housing
Development Authority obligations. Id. § 326.1. For general discussions of "moral obligation"
bonds, see Development of State HFAs, supra note 28, at 473-74; Salsich, Housing Finance
Agencies: Instruments of State Housing Policy or Confused Hybrids?, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J.
595, 598-604 (1978). Because states are only "morally" liable on HFA obligations, HFAs are not
dependent upon the credit of their respective states.
37. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , §§ 307.2, .14, 314 (1979).
38. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 307.4 (1979). The Illinois Housing Development
Authority meets its current operation expenses by charging mortgagors a Development Loan
Fee of 1 % to 2% of the amount of the mortgage loan and an annual Service Fee of % to Y%
of the maximum principal amount of the mortgage loan.
39. I.R.C. § 103 (gross income does not include interest on state obligations). Section 103
has been amended by the Mortgage Subsidy Bond Tax Act of 1980, signed into law on De-
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interest rates than they would if the interest were taxable. 40  The lower
interest rates that HFAs obtain by selling tax-exempt bonds are passed on to
mortgagors in the form of lower than conventional mortgage interest rates.
In addition to providing mortgagors with lower than conventional interest
rates, HFAs implement HUD subsidy programs. The two most important
subsidy programs are those administered under section 23641 and section
8.42 The section 236 program 43 reduces rentals for lower income families
through mortgage interest reduction payments made by HUD to or on be-
half of mortgagors. 44 The interest reduction subsidy, which may be offered
with rental subsidies, is approximately the difference between payments that
would be due on a mortgage loan at one percent interest and payments that
would be due on a loan at the actual current interest rate.45 The lower
interest rate is ultimately beneficial to tenants because it permits the
owner 46 to establish lower rents than would otherwise be possible. 4
7
The section 8 programs operate through rent subsidies funneled through
an HFA48 pursuant to contracts between HUD and an HFA and between an
cember 5, 1980. See [1980] 9 FED. TAXES (P-H) 59,703; [1980] Hous. & DEV. REP. (BNA)
594-97. The Act provides certain limitations on the tax-exempt status of municipal bonds. Rel-
evant for the purposes of this Article is the provision limiting the exemption to obligations
substantially all the proceeds of which are used for multi-family rental housing in which
specified percentages of the units are to be occupied by low and moderate income persons. Id.
at 597.
It should also be noted that under current law interest on HFA obligations is taxable if the
HFA has elected to receive benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 1440 (1976) (providing for guarantees of
HFA obligations and certain grants). See id. § 1440(h)(2). In this way, Congress has attempted
to induce HFAs to allow income on their bonds to be taxed.
40. See Development of State HFAs, supra note 28, at 472-74.
41. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976).
42. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976).
43. Since January 1973, HUD has not entered into any new § 236 contracts. Section 8 has
become the most significant federal housing assistance program. Hance & Duvall, supra note
34, at 721-22.
44. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(a) (1976).
45. Id. § 1715z-1(c).
46. A project owner for the purposes of § 236 is an "owner of a rental housing project
designed for occupancy by lower income families." 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(a) (1976).
47. Section 236 provides certain formulas for setting subsidized rentals. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-
1(f) (1976). Briefly, a developer must establish, with the approval of the Secretary of HUD, a
"basic rental charge," calculated for each dwelling unit based on the payment of principal and
interest due on a mortgage bearing interest at 1%. The developer must also establish a "fair
market rental charge," calculated on the basis of the payments due on the mortgage on which
the developer is actually obligated. The actual rental for each dwelling unit must fall between
these two calculated rental charges and must equal 25% of the tenant's income. Id. § 1715z-
1(0(1). The statute also allows alterations of the actual rental to allow for contingencies, such as
25% of a tenant's income not exceeding the "basic rental charge" or separate utility metering of
dwelling units resulting in real rental costs exceeding 25% of a tenant's income. Id. §§ 1715z-
1(f)(1), (2). Further, § 236 permits additional payments to the project owner to offset increasing
operating expenses, including utility costs and local taxes. Id. § 1715z-I(f)(3).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 1437fqb) (1976). In areas where no HFAs exist, HUD is authorized to
perform the functions of HFAs and to enter into contracts directly with project owners. Id.
§ 1437f(b)(1). It is not unusual, however, for both HUD and an HFA to administer § 8 programs
in the same area.
1030
1980] SUBSIDIZED RENTAL PROJECTS IN DEFAULT 1031
HFA and a project owner.4 9 The subsidies 50 are paid to, or for the account
of, a project owner 51 and result in lower rents for lower and moderate in-
come families 52 who live in the projects. 53
HFAs are delegated significant responsibilities under section 8.54 These
responsibilities include financing, 55 approving site, design and construction
quality, 56 determining economic feasibility, 5 7 and supervising manage-
ment. 58 HUD has increasingly relied upon HFAs for financing develop-
ments under section 8. In fact, by the mid-1970's HUD had earmarked for
HFAs to administer over one-fourth of available section 8 funds, or approxi-
mately $225 million. 59
The Developer
The potential profits of a developer who successfully completes a project
are substantial. For the purposes of the following discussion, it is assumed
that the developer has no economic ties with the general contractor, ar-
chitect or managing agent. To the extent that the developer and these other
parties are identical or related, the developer will realize additional profits.
A developer must face the problem of raising capital. Most HFAs will
grant a mortgage of up to ninety percent of the replacement value of a pro-
49. Id. § 1437f(b)(2). The principal contracts in this arrangement are: (1) Agreement to
Enter into Housing Assistance Contract-between an HFA and an owner; (2) Annual Contribu-
tions Contract-between HUD and an HFA, see id. §§ 1437c, 1437d, 1437f(b), 1437g; 24
C.F.R. §§ 883.401-.411 (1980); and (3) Housing Assistance Payment Contract-between HFA
and owner, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 1437f(c)-(e) (1976); 24 C.F.R. §§ 880.501-.507, 881.501-.507,
883.601-.607 (1980). Through an additional agreement HFAs often require mortgagors to pledge
their § 8 subsidy payments as security for their mortgage loans.
50. Calculations used to determine the amounts of the subsidies, called "monthly assistance
payments," are set out in § 8. Id. § 1437fc)(3).
51. A project owner for the purpose of § 8 is "any private person or entity, including a
cooperative, or a public housing agency, having a legal right to lease or sublease newly con-
structed or substantially rehabilitated dwellings ..... Id. § 1437fqf)(4).
52. "Lower-income families" are generally those whose income does not exceed 80% of the
median income for the area. Id. § 1437f()(1).
53. The "maximum monthly rent" the owner is entitled to receive may not, except under
"special circumstances," exceed by more than 10% the "fair market rental" established periodi-
cally by the Secretary of HUD and published in the Federal Register. The "maximum monthly
rent" is a required term of the Housing Assistance Payment Contract, which must also provide
that the "maximum monthly rent" shall be adjusted from time to time to reflect fluctuations in
the "fair market rental". Id. §§ 1437f(c)(1), (2).
54. See 24 C.F.R. §§ 883.101-713 (1980). Currently in effect are interim rules promulgated
on January 30, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 6886-910 (1980). These interim rules primarily make
stylistic changes, although there are some substantive alterations. Certain sections of Part 883
have been amended and made final since January 30, 1980. See 45 Fed. Reg. 56,324-28 (1980).
55. 24 C.F.R. § 883.307 (1980).
56. Id. 9 883.309, .310, .406.
57. Id. 9§883.401-.411.
58. Id. 9 883.701-.713.
59. Hance & Duvall, supra note 34, at 722.
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ject. 60 Although this would result in a ten percent equity requirement, a
developer is rarely required to contribute even this amount of cash because
developers are typically given a Builder's and Sponsor's Risk Fee of eight to
nine percent of the replacement cost which is applied against the equity
requirement. 61 Thus, the developer generally is required to put up only
one to two percent of the replacement cost in cash. Additional costs for
letters of credit as security for various contractual obligations and for possible
construction cost overruns often increase the developer's cash requirements.
The cash required by private developers is generated by the sale of lim-
ited partnership 62 interests to investors. 63 The gross sale price of limited
partnership interests typically amounts to twenty-five percent of the
mortgage amount. Fees for organizing, building and initial rent-up of the
project, sometimes established in the partnership agreement, are the major
source of the developer's profit. If, in fact, the developer has created a lim-
ited partnership,6 4 the entity is usually structured so that the developer is
the general partner. Should the project be sufficiently profitable, distribu-
tions might be made. Although these distributions are usually limited by
statute, 65 it is usual for the limited partnership agreement to provide that
the developer, as a general partner of the limited partnership, is entitled to
one or two percent of any distributions. The project's residual value is also a
potential source of profit for the developer. Typically, the partnership
agreement provides that when the project is sold or refinanced the general
partner will receive fifty percent of the profits remaining after the limited
partners are returned their investments. The balance of profits is then
shared by the limited partners. Because the HFA's mortgage and note nor-
60. See, e.g., ILLINOIS HOUSING DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, HOUSING: A COMMUNITY
HANDBOOK 43 (1974).
61. In Illinois, the Builder's and Sponsor's Risk Fee is 10% of the sum of construction costs,
various fees, and financing and carrying charges. Id. at 46, 96.
62. A limited partnership is defined as "a partnership formed by two or more persons ...
having as members one or more general partners and one or more limited partners." UNIFORM
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1. The general statutory requirements are the signing and filing
of a certificate indicating: (1) the business' name, character and location; (2) the name and
residence of each partner; (3) the partnership term; (4) the quantum of each limited partner's
tangible contribution; (5) the partner's share of profits; and (6) procedures for changing partner-
ship personnel. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 2.
63. A developer normally must advance the option cost of the project's land and the cost of
architectural plans and specifications. After the mortgage loan is initially closed, that is, when all
documents reflecting the loan are executed, limited partners make their first capital contribu-
tions. These contributions are used to reimburse the developer for the foregoing costs.
64. In states, such as Illinois, where real estate is commonly owned in land trusts, the actual
owner/mortgagor of a project is a land trust in which a limited partnership typically owns the
beneficial interest. For most purposes the existence of the land trust can be disregarded. This
Article generally discusses limited partnerships as though they owned legal title to projects. The
use of land trusts, however, has been important in the context of Chapter XII bankruptcy
reorganizations. See notes 150-152 and accompanying text infra.
65. In Illinois, annual distribution is generally limited to 6% of the entity's equity in the
project. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 308 (1979).
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mally do not permit prepayment for twenty years,6 6 this source of profit is
deferred. Nonetheless, it can ultimately be substantial.
Investors in Projects
Individuals are motivated to invest in subsidized housing projects by the
tax shelter permitted by limited partnership ownership. The limited partner-
ship is attractive for investors because it not only confers tax advantages 67
but also limits their liability.68 Investing in a project's limited partnership
is, however, appropriate only for persons who can enjoy the tax benefits and
afford the risks involved. Private placement memoranda for limited partner-
ship interests generally indicate that such a person should have a net worth
(exclusive of home, furnishings and automobile) of at least $100,000, and
gross income of $35,000. Minimums are established through state suitability
standards for limited partnership offerings in real estate. 69 Although a given
project might produce sufficient income to enable an investor to receive cash
distributions or might substantially appreciate in value, these possibilities
raise long-term considerations and, for most investors, are probably less im-
portant reasons for investing than tax benefits.
Generally, the limited partnership is disregarded as a taxable entity, 70 and
partners are individually responsible for their distributive share of income,
losses, deductions and credits. 71 This tax feature of the limited partnership
enables the limited partner to have the benefit of partnership deductions
and losses to offset non-partnership income, and to take these deductions in
amounts that can greatly exceed the limited partner's actual tangible con-
tribution to the partnership. The availability of deductions, the ability to
take advantage of such deductions under the method for calculating basis,
and the general disregard of a limited partnership as a taxable entity create
an attractive tax shelter.
A limited partner is virtually assured of obtaining short-term deductions
that compare favorably in amount with equity invested. These deductions
include: (1) accelerated depreciation, which can be calculated on the double
declining balance method allowed for new residential housing; 72 (2) interest
66. The prepayment moratorium is intended to ensure that the project is used as low in-
come housing for at least twenty years.
67. See I.R.C. § 704(a).
68. As a general rule, a limited partner assumes no liability beyond his or her capital con-
tribution and, perhaps, interest on that contribution. See generally Comment, The Limited
Partnership, 45 YALE L.J. 895 (1936).
69. See, e.g., 1A BLUE SKY L. REP. (CCH) 23,207 (the standards reported are set forth in
Illinois Securities Department Bulletin No. 314, Feb. 1980).
70. I.R.C. § 701.
71. Id. §§ 702, 704. See generally D. KAHN, BASIC CORPORATE TAXATION 432-51 (2d ed.
1973).
72. I.R.C. § 167(j). Note that excess depreciation on some subsidized housing receives the
benefit of a special recapture rule. See id. § 1250(a)(1)(B)(ii); notes 106-107 and accompanying
text infra. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.167(j)-l (1980).
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payments on the mortgage loan; 73 (3) real estate taxes; 7  and (4) various
construction period expenses. 75
The other two aspects of the tax treatment crucial to the successful use of
limited partnerships as tax shelters are the computation of a limited partner's
basis in the project and the general disregard of the partnership as a taxable
entity. A limited partner's basis is generally the cost of the interest in the
partnership, increased by income (and decreased by losses) attributable to
the interest. 76 Most significantly, a limited partner's tax basis includes a
proportionate share of the partnership's nonrecourse liabilities, at least when
they do not exceed the fair market value of the collateral subject to them. 77
Accordingly, the limited partner's tax basis is augmented by a share of the
mortgage loan for the project. The general disregard of the partnership as a
taxable entity results in individual tax liability of the partners for their dis-
tributive share of income, losses, and certain deductions and credits. 7
These features combine to enable a limited partner to offset non-
partnership income with partnership losses and deductions and to take these
deductions in amounts that greatly exceed that partner's cash contribution to
the partnership. Serious tax consequences may, however, result from a mis-
step in structuring or operating a limited partnership. 79 If it were taxed as
a corporation, it would have to pay federal income taxes on net partnership
income. Moreover, limited partners would be unable to take personal de-
73. 1.R.C. § 163.
74. Id. § 164.
75. See Parks v. United States, 434 F. Supp. 206 (N.D. Tex. 1977); Lay v. Commissioner,
69 T.C. 421 (1977); Francis v. Commissioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 704 (1977); Trivett v. Commis-
sioner, 36 T.C.M. (CCH) 675 (1977). Note the special consideration concerning the deductibil-
ity of fees involved when a partnership makes payments to a partner for services rendered. See
I.R.C. §§ 707(a), (c); Pratt v. Commissioner, 550 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1977).
76. 1.R.C. § 705.
77. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.752-1(e); Rev. Rul. 77-110; 1977-1 C.B. 58. But see Brountas v.
Commissioner, 73 T.C. 491 (1980). The proportionate share of nonrecourse liabilities corre-
sponds to the limited partner's share in partnership profits. Note that nonrecourse liabilities are
liabilities that partnership assets are subject to, but for which limited and general partners are
not liable. This is the typical situation under subsidized housing mortgages and regulatory
agreements.
78. .R.C. §§ 702, 704.
79. A limited partnership will shelter its members only if the Internal Revenue Service
(IRS) accepts the characterization of the entity as such. In accordance with Morrisey v. Com-
missioner, 296 U.S. 344 (1935), the IRS considers six characteristics for tax classification pur-
poses: "(i) Associates, (ii) an objective to carry on business and divide the gains therefrom, (iii)
continuity of life, (iv) centralization of management, (v) liability for corporate debts limited to
corporate property, and (vi) free transferability." Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (1962). The pres-
ence of these characteristics indicates that a business is a corporation; their absence indicates a
different form of business enterprise. Because the first two characteristics are common to both
corporations and partnerships, the remaining four become determinative. It can be problematic
for a limited partnership to avoid the trait of limited liability. See Treas. Reg. 301.7701(d)(2)
(1962); Cabinet & Coffey, Housing Partnerships: Shelters from Taxes and Shelters for People,
20 CASE W. REs. L. REv. 723, 738 (1969). These criteria are not easy to apply. See Zuckman v.
United States, 524 F.2d 729 (Ct. Cl. 1975); Larson v. Commissioner, 66 T.C. 159 (1976);
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ductions for net partnership losses, and distributions to them would be taxed
as dividends to the extent the partnership had earnings and profits.
80
FINANCIAL DEFAULT WITHOUT VIOLATING THE REGULATORY AGREEMENT
Assume that the housing project has been built. All mortgage loan funds
have been properly expended, agreements have been complied with and the
project is structurally sound. Nevertheless, the project is financially delin-
quent. How should an HFA approach the problem?
Initially, it is important to determine the financial facts. An audit or finan-
cial investigation should be performed by a certified public accountant. Such
financial data may furnish a basis of agreed facts from which the parties can
bargain. In addition, the management department of the HFA,8 1 working
with the project's management agent, should attempt to forecast the future
finances of the project. This forecast can give the HFA an idea of the
amount of funds needed for the project to succeed. For example, in addition
to curing financial delinquencies, improvements to the project might be
necessary to enhance the marketability of its units. Once the required
background data is obtained, the HFA and the owners should begin an open
exchange of information and positions. At this point, the parties will have
two basic courses: the partnership can provide additional capital for the proj-
ect or there can be a foreclosure by the HFA. Each of these options must
be considered in greater depth.
Horwood, The Corporate Nominee/General Partner, 37th ANNUAL N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. ch.
14 (pt. 1 1979); Note, Tax Classification of Limited Partnerships, 90 HARv. L. REv. 745 (1977).
Therefore, the organizers of and investors in a limited partnership would find it highly desirable
to obtain an advance IRS ruling on whether the limited partnership form would be respected
for tax purposes; however, the IRS has adopted a policy that so severely restricts the availability
of advance rulings regarding this question that they are practically unavailable for tax shelter
limited partnerships. Specifically, advance rulings on a limited partnership's classification can be
obtained only when the conditions set forth in Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972 C.B. 735, and Rev. Proc.
74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438, are satisfied. It is unlikely that a tax shelter limited partnership would
meet the following condition set forth in Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 C.B. 438: "The aggregate
deductions to be claimed by the partners as their distributive shares of partnership losses for
the first two years of operation of the limited partnership will not exceed the amount of equity
capital invested in the limited partnership."
80. Another pitfall for investors is the possibility that the "hobby loss" provision of I.R.C.
§ 183 would preclude them from getting the benefit of the limited partnership deductions. As a
matter of deference to Congress' national housing policy, however, the IRS has decided not to
pursue this challenge, at least with respect to § 236 housing. See Rev. Rul. 79-300, 1979-2 C.B.
112.
81. HFAs often organize themselves into functional departments. For example, the Director
of the Illinois Housing Development Authority is empowered to create a legal department, a
production department, a marketing and management department, a credit and audit services
department, a finance and investment department, an accounting department and a human
services department. 44 II1. Reg. 452, 453 (1980).
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Preventing Foreclosure Through Workout Arrangements
Requiring Additional Investment
A prime consideration that arises when an owner and an HFA attempt to
structure a workout arrangement is whether the owner will commit addi-
tional capital to the project. Foreclosure normally causes serious financial
harm to the partners of a limited partnership. Accordingly, limited partners
will generally agree in a workout arrangement either to furnish additional
capital or to relinquish some of their interests through a resyndication in an
attempt to avoid foreclosure.
Additional capital invested in the project by existing partners could cure
some financial defaults and permit physical improvements necessary for a
project's long-term success. Obviously, too, the HFA's flexibility in structur-
ing a workout agreement should increase when the owner demonstrates a
substantial additional financial commitment to the project.
If an owner is unable or unwilling to raise additional capital from existing
partners, then sales of partnership interests to third parties may be required.
Restructuring the partnership agreement may, however, create additional
problems. In any arrangement restructuring the ownership of a limited
partnership, the danger of inadvertently terminating the partnership is pres-
ent. For federal tax purposes, termination occurs if "within a 12-month
period there is a sale or exchange of 50 percent or more of the total interest
in partnership capital and profits."8 2 Although the words "sale or exchange"
seemingly apply to both direct and indirect transactions, the IRS has not
interpreted them so broadly that partnership resyndication necessarily trig-
gers partnership termination. 83 If, however, a resyndication does terminate
a partnership for tax purposes, the effect on the partners can be costly. Be-
cause only the first-user of property gains the maximum benefits of using the
double declining balance method of calculating depreciation, the resyndica-
tion could reduce their tax benefit.8 4
Even if the first-user status of a partnership is preserved, a resyndication
may have other adverse tax consequences for limited partners. Most resyn-
dications involve an infusion of new capital into the partnership through the
sale of new partnership interests, thus diluting the ownership of the original
limited partners. This dilution is recognized by the IRS as conferring a ben-
82. I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B).
83. A typical resyndication might involve a contribution by one partner and the withdrawal
of another. Arguably, these steps should be "stepped" into one indirect "sale or exchange" for
purposes of I.R.C. § 708(b)(1)(B): however, they might not be so combined because the con-
tribution of property to the partnership for interests in the partnership generally does not con-
stitute a "sale or exchange." See Treas. Reg. § 1.708-1(b)(1)(ii) (1956); Rev. Rul. 75-423, 1975-2
C.B. 260. By contrast, a direct sale or exchange of a partnership interest from one partner to
another would clearly be a "sale or exchange." Id.
84. First-user status is required by I.R.C. § 167(j)(2)(A)(ii) for the taxpayer to employ the
most accelerated depreciation formula for § 1250 property, which includes residential property.
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efit upon the original limited partners for which they might be taxed, even
though they receive no payments or distributions. 85
At the time when partnership resyndication is contemplated, a further
consideration for limited partners is that their activities must be consistent
with their position as limited partners. Otherwise, a resyndication can have
ramifications for the limited partnership under both federal tax law and a
state limited partnership act. The tax issue is chiefly whether a resyndication
will cause the limited partnership to be treated as having "centralized man-
agement," one of the criteria distinguishing corporations from other associa-
tions.8 6  Beyond tax considerations, intrusion by limited partners into the
management of a limited partnership can cause these partners to be deemed
general partners, thereby subjecting them to general liability.8 7 Accord-
ingly, they should not become so involved in the management or control of
the partnership that their position as limited partners is jeopardized. In es-
sence, resyndication can be an attractive way for limited partners to avoid
foreclosure of the housing project, but they cannot play a leading role in
bringing about the resyndication. 88
85. The dilution reduces partnership liabilities allocated to the original limited partners. In
accordance with I.R.C. § 752(b), this decrease in liability is the equivalent of the distribution of
money, which generally would reduce the basis of a partnership interest. Gain is not normally
recognized, except to the extent that the distribution exceeds the partner's adjusted basis.
Id. § 731(a)(1). Gain may, however, be recognized separately in respect to "unrealized re-
ceivables, which include excess accelerated depreciation." Id. § 731(c). This may cause im-
mediate recognition of ordinary income by the partner to the extent of the allocable deprecia-
tion recapture. Clearly, a cash distribution exceeding a limited partner's adjusted basis is
treated as ordinary income to the extent of the partner's share in the partnership's unrealized
receivables. Rev. Rul. 73-300, 1973-2 C.B. 215. A constructive distribution, as occurs in a
diluting resyndication, may be treated similarly. See Rabinowitz & Berenson, The Failing Real
Estate Investment and the Federal Income Tax, 34th ANN. N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAX. 357,
387-88 (1976).
86. See note 79 supra. Limited partnerships that are organized and operate under a statute
corresponding to the Uniform Limited Partnership Act usually will not be found to have cen-
tralized management, unless the limited partners own substantially all the partnership interests.
Treas. Reg. § 3 01.7701-2(c)(4) (1962). A determination that a limited partnership has become a
corporation would have adverse tax consequences for the limited partners. See notes 78-80 and
accompanying text supra.
87. The Uniform Limited Partnership Act provides that a limited partner's liability remains
limited unless he or she "takes part in the control of the business." UNIFORM LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP ACT § 7. See Feld, The "Control" Test For Limited Partnerships, 82 HAtv. L.
REv. 1471 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Feld].
88. It is unsettled how much control the limited partner must exercise in partnership affairs
before he or she incurs liability under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act's control test. One
commentator observed that the decisions are of little help in clarifying the contours of this test.
See Feld, supra note 87, at 1476.
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Foreclosure
In the event that defaults are not cured or a workout arrangement is not
consummated, then the HFA may resort to foreclosure.8 9 Because foreclo-
sure changes the ownership of a project, it has substantial repercussions for
each of the parties interested in the project's financing-HUD; the HFA
and its bondholders; and the owners of the project, both general and limited
partners. The consequences of foreclosure for each party must be examined
separately.
HUD
The primary contribution that HUD makes to an operating project is its
subsidy payments. Under section 236,90 these subsidies are in the form of
interest reduction payments and under section 8, in the form of rent sup-
plements. 91 Foreclosure interrupts, at least temporarily, subsidy payments
for a section 236 project. During foreclosure proceedings two requirements
of section 236 could be violated: that the project be subject to a mortgage
and that it be owned by a private entity. 92 The requirement that the project
be subject to a mortgage appears to constitute the more important obstacle
to continued payments under section 236. Conceivably, the results of fore-
closure could vary among the states because it appears that the times when
this and other requirements of section 236 cease to be met are governed by
applicable state law. 92 In Illinois, for example, the property probably would
not be considered subject to a mortgage after the entry of a foreclosure
decree or after foreclosure sale. 94 Nevertheless, the section 236 payments
89. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 67 , § 307.12 (1979) (granting Illinois Housing De-
velopment Authority power to acquire real property, or any interest therein, by mortgage fore-
closure).
90. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1 (1976).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f (1976).
92. Section 1715z-I(b) provides that "interest reduction payments may be made with respect
to a mortgage .. . on a rental or cooperative housing project owned by a private nonprofit
corporation or other private nonprofit entity, a limited dividend corporation or other limited
dividend entity, or a cooperative housing corporation . 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-l(b) (1976)
(emphasis added). See also 24 C.F.R. § 236.10 (1980).
93. Section 236 provides that the term "mortgage" as used in that section has the same
meaning as in 12 U.S.C. § 1707. 12 U.S.C. § 1715z-1(j)(2)(C) (1976). Section 1707 defines
mortgage as "'first mortgage on real estate" and provides that "the term 'first mortgage' means
such classes of first liens as are commonly given to secure advances on . . . real estate, under
the laws of the state, in which the real estate is located .... Id. § 1707(a).
94. See, e.g., Johnson v. Zahn, 380 I11. 320, 325, 44 N.E.2d 15, 18 (1942); Gaskin v. Smith,
375 Ill. 59, 65, 30 N.E.2d 624, 627 (1941); Wayman v. Cochrane, 35 III. 151, 154-56 (1864). In
Wayman, the court held that when a mortgagee recovered judgment on a note secured by a
mortgage and subsequently sued to foreclose on the mortgage, it was error for the lower court
to enter judgment, upon sale of the subject property, for the amount of the principal debt and
for interest until the date of sale at 10%, the interest rate specified by the note. 35 I11. at 156.
Rather, the court held that interest should be allowable at 6%, the legal interest rate. The court
reasoned, apparently, that the decree of foreclosure terminated the mortgage and therefore
released the property from the mortgage's provisions. Id. at 154. Logically, if a decree of fore-
closure ends the legal existence of a mortgage, the property is no longer subject to the
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will be resumed provided the project is sold to an eligible owner and is
again subject to a mortgage. 95
A project can be eligible for section 8 subsidy payments even though it is
neither privately owned nor subject to a mortgage. 96 The authorizing legis-
lation for section 8 does not prevent continuation of subsidy payments dur-
ing foreclosure proceedings. Further, the implementing regulations indicate
that, possibly subject to HUD approval, subsidy payments continue in that
circumstance. 97
HFAs
The two primary considerations for an HFA in deciding whether or not to
foreclose a project are the foreclosure's potential impact on providing hous-
ing for persons of low and moderate income 9 and on the investment of the
mortgage. The Wayman case could therefore be used to argue that because a foreclosure decree
terminates a mortgage, such a decree would terminate HUD's authority to make payments
under § 236.
Under the Johnson and Gaskin cases, on the other hand, it could be argued that only an
actual foreclosure sale terminates a mortgage and that only then would HUD's obligation cease.
In both of these cases the supreme court stated that only after foreclosure sale had the mortgage
expended its force and the property become no longer subject to the provisions of the
mortgage. Johnson v. Zahn, 380 I11. at 325, 44 N.E.2d at 18; Gaskin v. Smith, 375 I11. at 65, 30
N.E.2d at 627.
Title will not vest in the mortgagee or its successor, however, until the delivery of the
sheriff's deed, after the statutory redemption period accorded the mortgagor expires. ILL. REV.
STAT. ch. 77, § 18e (1979). The equity of redemption can be waived, however, by a corporate
trustee. Id. § 18b. Title could pass directly to a successor owner-mortgagor without the HFA
actually having title. Cf. id. § 30.
95. 24 C.F.R. § 236.505 (1980) (incorporating 24 C.F.R. § 236.40(d) (1980)).
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(f)(4) (1976). Because § 8 focuses on rent supplements and not on
mortgage interest payments, the statute is primarily concerned with tenant eligibility require-
ments and not with allowable types of owners. Section 8 defines an owner as "any private
person or entity, including a cooperative, or a public housing agency, having a legal right to
lease or sublease newly constructed or substantially rehabilitated dwellings ...." Id.
97. Although the regulations are currently being revised, see note 54 supra, the latest regu-
lations provide as follows:
(d) Foreclosure and Other Transfers
In the event of foreclosure, assignment, or sale in lieu of foreclosure, or other
assignment or sale approved by HUD,
(1) The Agreement [to Enter into a Housing Assistance Payments Contract], the
[Housing Assistance Payments] Contract and ACC [Annual Contributions Contract]
will continue in effect, and
(2) Housing assistance payments will continue in accordance with the terms of the
[Housing Assistance Payments] Contract.
24 C.F.R. § 883.307 (1980).
98. Provision of decent, safe and sanitary housing at low and moderate rentals to persons
and families of low and moderate income is generally stated as the goal of statutes creating
HFAs. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , § 303 (1979).
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bondholders that the mortgage secures. 99 A foreclosure proceeding could
cause the project to be sold free from restrictions designed to ensure its use
for low and moderate income housing. 100 Foreclosure actions might also
create, or call attention to, financial difficulties within an HFA, thereby in-
hibiting the marketability of bond issues. Bond rating agencies probably
would look favorably upon an aggressive campaign by an HFA to pursue
financial delinquencies.
Limited Partners
Foreclosure of a project not only deprives limited partners of their owner-
ship interests in the project, but also creates tax problems. The loss of own-
ership in a project for a limited partner eliminates a capital asset, an interest
in the asset's appreciation, and possible dividends. These losses, however,
are likely to be less costly to investors than the tax consequences accompany-
ing foreclosure. 101
Foreclosure usually creates a tax liability for limited partners in two ways.
First, foreclosure may be viewed as a sale of property, the amount due the
mortgagee at foreclosure being the sale price. 10 2 Limited partners' gain for
tax purposes upon foreclosure will be the amount by which the pro rata
share of the mortgage debt exceeds the limited partner's adjusted basis in
the project. 10 3 The nature of the tax treatment, however, is not clear in all
99. Protection of persons who have invested in HFA bonds is necessary for HFAs to remain
viable. Statutes creating HFAs have various safeguards intended to assure that investments in
HFA bonds will be secure. These include "moral obligations" undertaken by state legislatures to
appropriate additional monies when HFA funds are insufficient to pay principal and interest on
HFA bonds as well as provisions authorizing debt service and capital reserve funds. See, e.g.,
ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67Yh, §§ 314, 326.1, 323a (1979). See note 36 supra.
100. Under usual procedures for foreclosure sales, the project would be sold to the highest
bidder regardless of whether it would subsequently be used for low and moderate income hous-
ing.
101. Investors in a project limited partnership are primarily motivated by the tax treatment
accorded their investment. See notes 67-80 and accompanying text supra. Before foreclosure, a
limited partner probably will have obtained tax benefits that will compensate for the
foreclosure-caused loss of the capital contribution. The occurrence of a financial default suggests
a current cash flow problem for the project. Moreover, the failure of the HFA and limited
partnership to reach a workout agreement at least casts doubt on whether the project owner
considers it viable. For a discussion of cash and tax benefits flowing from § 236 projects, see
Note, The Multi-Faceted Needs of Low-Income Housing: Inadequacy of a Narrow-Focus on
Capital Input, 21 ST. Louis U. L.J. 693, 702 (1978).
102. See Woodsam Assocs., Inc., 16 T.C. 649 (1951), aff'd, 198 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1952). See
generally I.R.C. § 1001. Proposed treasury regulation § 1.1001-2, set out at 44 Fed. Reg.
76,315 (1979), indicates that the full amount of the mortgage debt is treated as money received
upon foreclosure, even if the property's fair market value is less than the amount of the debt.
See Millar v. Commissioner, 577 F.2d 212 (3d Cir. 1978); John F. Tufts, 70 T.C. 756 (1978).
Note that I.R.C. § 1039 provides that gain from the sale or disposition of certain government
assisted housing is not recognized when there is an approved disposition of the housing and the
taxpayer reinvests in another qualified project.
103. As discussed at note 77 and accompanying text supra, a limited partner's basis includes
a share of nonrecourse liabilities. The original basis is adjusted by prior deductions.
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instances and possibly will be affected by choices made by the limited
partners. 10 4
Secondly, the limited partner's tax liability also is likely to be affected by
provisions for the recapture of accelerated depreciation as ordinary income.
Generally, accelerated depreciation allowed for new housing is subject to
recapture to the extent that there is gain on the disposition of the prop-
erty. 10 5 This amount will be treated as ordinary income to the investor.' 0 6
If, however, the project in default was funded under section 8 rather than
section 236, then the recapture may be calculated more advantageously for
the limited partners. The recapture provisions of the 1976 Tax Reform Act
applicable to section 8 and certain other subsidized projects require a pro-
gressive reduction in the amount recaptured once a project has been owned
100 months. 10 7 The reduction allowed is one percent per month.' 0 8 Thus, if
the project has been owned longer than sixteen years and eight months,
there would be no recapture. Because of these additional tax liabilities, lim-
ited partners will usually want to stave off foreclosure. Accordingly, any
foreclosure proceedings are likely to be protracted, 10 9 which, incidentally, is
another reason foreclosure is unattractive to an HFA. 110
General Partners
To the extent that general partners have interests in the income and losses
from projects comparable to those of limited partners and have obtained
comparable tax benefits, foreclosure would affect general partners and lim-
104. The gain accruing upon foreclosure might be treated as ordinary income to the extent
required by depreciation recapture provisions (see discussion at note 73 supra and notes 105-108
and accompanying text infra) and as capital gain as to the remainder. This result would be
consistent with viewing foreclosure as equivalent to a sale of property. If such gain were consid-
ered solely to arise from the discharge of a liability, then it arguably should be considered
ordinary income in its entirety. If the foreclosure is characterized as a discharge of liability, then
the election provisions of I.R.C. §§ 108 and 1017 would apply. Such an election would permit
the limited partner to reduce the basis of the partnership interest instead of recognizing income
from the discharge of indebtedness. Cf. Estate of Jerrold Delman, 73 T.C. No. 3 (1979). Recent
legislation provides that partners separately, and not the partnership, make such an election.
I.R.C. § 703(b)(2). See generally Podolin, How to Handle the Burned Out Tax Shelter, 37th
ANNUAL N.Y.U. INST. ON FED. TAx. ch. 16, 16-18 (pt. 1 1979).
105. I.R.C. §§ 56(a), 57(a)(2).
106. Excess depreciation is made a tax preference item under the code. See id.
107. Special recapture rules for § 8 projects are established by I.R.C. §§ 1250(a)(1)(B)(i), (b).
108. Id.
109. HUD's foreclosures generally take about two and one-half years to complete. Hearings
on Multi-Family Properties, supra note 20, at 259.
110. Ironically, in some instances, foreclosure proceedings themselves have served as the
ultimate tax shelter for limited partners by permitting tax deductions for expenses that are not
paid. Hearings on Multi-Family Properties, supra note 20, at 260-61. Although precise figures
on losses from this practice are unavailable, the IRS recognizes that deductions for accrued
interest, other expenses, and depreciation are taken during periods of mortgage delinquency
and foreclosure, even when the associated payments are not made. Id. Any such deductions
should be recaptured once liability ends.
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ited partners similarly. Foreclosure, however, could have other unique con-
sequences for general partners.
General partners are likely to be involved in other similar projects and
probably anticipate comparable future involvement. Accordingly, to the ex-
tent that foreclosure harms a general partner's reputation, his or her chances
of successfully developing projects in the future are diminished. Further-
more, actions of general partners leading to default and foreclosure, if suffi-
ciently egregious, may result in debarment or suspension from contracting
with HUD " or particular HFAs. Persons and businesses seeking to obtain
certain forms of federal assistance for proposed projects are required to dis-
close their involvement in other federally assisted projects, including any
which have defaulted. 112  Additional financial problems may be caused by
the change in a project's ownership following foreclosure. These include the
general partner's loss of entitlement to a share of the income generated by
the project and loss of interest in the project's residual value. 113 Moreover,
a change of ownership terminates any administrative or management fee that
the general partner may derive either from the partnership or from the proj-
ect itself. 114
Of course, the general partner must also face the possibility that limited
partners will bring suit for damages suffered from the loss of their invest-
111. The regulations governing debarment, suspension and ineligibility of contractors, includ-
ing those directly or indirectly receiving HUD funds, are set out at 24 C.F.R. §§ 24.0-.23
(1980). These regulations are currently being revised, primarily to strengthen the safeguards for
HUD program participants. See 45 Fed. Reg. 46,012 (1980). For an instance of a sponsor-
general partner being suspended from participation in HUD projects under the current regula-
tions, see Sahni v. HUD, 478 F. Supp. 882 (D.D.C. 1979).
112. 24 C.F.R. §§ 200.210-.218 (1980). The regulations require that the principals of a pro-
posed project, including the general partners of a limited partnership, list any HUD projects in
which they have participated and state whether any such project has defaulted or has received
mortgage relief. Id. §§ 200.211, .212.
113. Although limited partnership agreements differ in respect to the benefits accruing to
general partners, it is common for them to provide the general partner with an interest in the
project's residual value that greatly exceeds his capital contribution. See text accompanying
notes 65-66 supra.
Allocations among partners of items such as income, gain, loss, and capital assets established
by a partnership agreement will be recognized for tax purposes unless they lack "substantial
economic effect." I.R.C. § 704(b)(2). Prior to amendment in 1976, (Tax Reform Act of 1976,
Pub. L. No. 94-455, Title II, § 213(d), 90 Stat. 1548), I.R.C. § 704(b)(2) recognized such alloca-
tions unless their purpose was "the avoidance or evasion of any tax ...." See 26 U.S.C.
§ 704(b)(2) (1976). The substantial similarity of the terms "lacking substantial economic effect" and
"avoiding or evading any tax" is made clear by the legislative history of the Tax Reform Act of
1976. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-654, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 125-27 (1976), reprinted in [1976] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 2897, 3020-22. See also Stanley C. Orrisch, 55 T.C. 395, 399-402
(1970); Private Ruling 7707260880A (Technical Advice Memorandum, July 26, 1977) (issue 3).
114. The case law is replete with instances in which general partners provided services to
projects for a fee or have interests in businesses that furnished such compensated services. See,
e.g., Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969); United States v. Gregory Park,
Section II, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1974).
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ment and recapture. Although theories of recovery will, of course, depend
upon particular factual circumstances, it should be recognized that the gen-
eral partner is likely to have a wide range of duties to the limited partners.
These duties might include contractual 115 and statutory116 partnership obli-
gations and attendant fiduciary responsibilities. 11 7 Moreover, actions based
on common law fraud 18 or the torts of waste or mismanagement 19 may be
appropriate in some situations. Finally, a limited partnership interest is a
security, and therefore purchasers of such interests are entitled to the pro-
tections of federal and state securities law.120 Accordingly, personal financial
considerations, if not regard for the interests of the limited partners, will
usually compel the general partner to contest vigorously a foreclosure action.
Defenses to Foreclosure
Because the effects of foreclosure can be so severe, mortgagors have raised
a variety of defenses in actions brought to foreclose government assisted
mortgages. Most such actions have been instituted by HUD, not HFAs, but
principles established in these cases are germane to cases brought by HFAs.
Some of the defenses are uniquely related to the government's role in
financing subsidized housing. The pervasive role that HUD and HFAs play
in supervising projects has afforded mortgagors opportunities to claim that
these governmental participants should be blamed for financial defaults.
Specifically, a common contention is that the failure of HUD or an HFA to
grant requested rent increases or subsidies so limited a project's income that
default was inevitable.'12 Courts, however, have not agreed that gov-
115. See, e.g., Marcus v. Green, 13 I11. App. 3d 699, 300 N.E.2d 512 (5th Dist. 1973);
Mayhew v. Craig, 253 I11. App. 238 (2d Dist. 1929).
116. See UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 (a general partner is "subject to all the
restrictions and liabilities of a partner in a partnership without limited partners" with some
exceptions). The Uniform Partnership Act sets forth certain obligations of partners to each other
the violation of which may give rise to causes of action. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT §§ 18-24.
117. See, e.g., Bandringa v. Bandringa, 20 I11. 2d 167, 170 N.E.2d 116 (1961); Ridgely v.
Central Pipe Line Co., 409 Ill. 46 (1951); Linn v. Clark, 295 II1. 22, 128 N.E. 824 (1920).
118. See, e.g., Maler v. Bull, 44 111. 97 (1867); Dickson v. Keehn, 263 I11. App. 146 (1st Dist.
1931); Brownback v. Nelson, 122 Mont. 525, 206 P.2d 1017 (1949).
119. See Maher v. Bull, 44 I11. 97 (1867); National Oats Co. v. Volkman, 29 I11. App. 3d 298,
330 N.E.2d 514 (5th Dist. 1975).
120. See Goodman v. Epstein, 582 F.2d 388, 406-09 (7th Cir. 1978). Note that the Supreme
Court in United Hous. Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 421 U.S. 837, 852 (1975), considering
whether stock entitling one to lease a cooperative apartment was a security, identified the fol-
lowing as characteristics of a security: "[1] an investment in a common venture [2] premised on
a reasonable expectation of profits [3] to be derived from the entrepreneurial or managerial
efforts of others." Under Goodman, the anticipation of initial tax losses does not preclude the
second criterion from being established. 582 F.2d at 407.
121. See, e.g., Donahue v. Massachusetts Hous. Fin. Agency, No. 78-882-MC (D. Mass.
Oct. 25, 1979); Hellerman v. Romney, 409 F. Supp. 352 (E.D. Wisc. 1976); United States v.
Gregory Park, Section 11, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317 (D.N.J. 1974); Thompson v. United States,
408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969).
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ernmental involvement has effectively shifted the risk of default from the
owner to the financing agencies.1 2 2  In addition, the courts have rejected
defenses, based upon HUD's financing nearby, competitive projects.1 23
Courts also have found that absent specific guidelines so requiring, HUD
need not enter into workout agreements, such as modification of mortgage
terms. 1 24 Finally, one court rejected the argument raised by an assignee of
a mortgage that HUD's inadequate supervision of the original mortgagor-
assignor caused the subject project's default.' 2 5
Mortgagors have also contended that a government agency should be
barred from foreclosure because it was guilty of fraud or misrepresenta-
tions. 126 Fraud allegations have commonly been asserted when the agency's
initial project appraisal was excessive, but the courts have rejected such con-
tentions on the ground that the appraisal is conducted for the agency's ben-
efit and not to aid the owner. 127 It should be noted, however, that in these
cases there was no direct contractual relationship between the agency mak-
ing the appraisal and the mortgagor.'1 2  Finally, the Eighth Circuit has held
that, although such alleged misrepresentations may constitute grounds for a
counterclaim for damages, they are irrelevant in a foreclosure proceeding.129
Equitable defenses to foreclosure have also been asserted.13 0 Mortgagors
have claimed that HUD should be estopped to proceed with foreclosure
because of representations made by agency officials that alternatives to fore-
closure would be considered. The courts have decided in these cases that
when the representations constituted unauthorized acts of government
agents the agency is not bound thereby.' 3 ' Thus, the agency is not barred
from proceeding with foreclosure.
122. See cases cited in note 121 supra.
123. See United States v. Kingswood Apartments, No. 77 C 2729 (N.D. I11. Oct. 24, 1978);
United States v. Sherman Gardens Co., 298 F. Supp. 1332 (D. Nev. 1967).
124. See, e.g., United States v. 1300 Lafayette East, 455 F. Supp. 988 (E.D. Mich. 1978).
125. United States v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 443 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. I11. 1977).
126. The extent to which equitable defenses such as fraud are recognized in foreclosure ac-
tions may vary depending on the jurisdiction. Illinois, for example, allows the assertion of all
equitable defenses that would be available in any other action. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95,
§§ 21, 22b, 23, 26 (1979). New York, on the other hand, severely limits the availability of
equitable defenses in foreclosure actions on the ground that such actions are essentially in rem.
See, e.g., Jo Ann Homes at Bellmore, Inc. v. Dworatz, 25 N.Y.2d 112, 302 N.Y.S.2d 799
(1969).
127. United States v. Neustadt, 366 U.S. 696, 708-09 (1961); United States v. Gregory Park,
Section I, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317, 352-53 (D.N.J. 1974).
128. See cases cited in note 127 supra.
129. United States v. Longo, 464 F.2d 913, 915 (8th Cir. 1972).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Woodland Terrace, Inc., 293 F.2d 505, 509 (4th Cir. 1961).
131. In United States v. Woodland Terrace, Inc., 293 F.2d 505 (4th Cir. 1961), the
mortgagor contended that oral statements of FHA representatives to the effect that the FHA
would, in the event of difficulty, assume management of the project, constituted a waiver of the
right to foreclose, or estopped the exercise of that right. The court disagreed, stating that unau-
thorized statements do not work an estoppel, and even if the statements were authorized, the
FHA had not waived its alternative contractual right to foreclose. id. at 509. The parole evi-
dence rule creates further problems for a mortgagor who would assert a contract modification or
equitable estoppel defense.
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Mortgagors have also invoked public policy as a defense to foreclosure,
arguing that it would be inconsistent with housing policies underlying the
federal subsidy programs to allow foreclosure because it would have a dis-
ruptive effect on the provision of low-cost housing. 132 The authorities are in
conflict, however, on whether such arguments constitute a valid defense to
foreclosure. 133 It seems fairly well established that where applicable statutes
or regulations expressly provide for certain procedures to be followed before
foreclosure a government agency's failure to follow such guidelines will bar
foreclosure. 134
Mortgagors generally have not been successful in interposing defenses
to preclude foreclosure, particularly in respect to multi-family projects. In-
deed, when HUD decides to foreclose a housing project, the federal courts
have accorded HUD broad discretion and substantial deference in this de-
cision. Utilizing the standard of judicial review provided for in the federal Ad-
ministrative Procedure Act, 13 5 these courts will review a foreclosure de-
cision to determine compliance with national housing policies, but will not
reverse the administrative decision unless it is found to be "arbitrary
or capricious." 136 In order for this standard to be met, it must be shown
132. See Encarnacion Hernandez v. Prudential Mortgage Corp., 553 F.2d 241, 242 (lst Cir.
1977); Associated East Mortgage Co. v. Young, 163 N.J. Super. 315, 328-31, 394 A.2d 899,
905-07 (1978); Government Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Screen, 85 Misc. 2d 86, 88-92, 379
N.Y.S.2d 327, 329-33 (Sup. Ct. 1976); Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d 814,
824-26, 372 N.Y.S.2d 485, 495-97 (Sup. Ct. 1976). See also Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n v.
Huffman, No. 73-CH-7453 (Cir. Ct., Cook County Apr. 17, 1975).
133. Whether the asserted public policy is a valid defense to foreclosure apparently depends
upon whether the defendant has relied upon HUD regulations, which have the force of law, or
upon statements contained in a HUD Handbook, which do not have such force. Compare As-
sociated East Mortgage Co. v. Young, 163 N.J. Super. 315, 394 A.2d 899 (1978) (because
Handbook provisions also appear in HUD regulations, defense is valid) and Federal Nat'l
Mortgage Ass'n v. Ricks, 83 Misc. 2d 814, 372 N.Y.S. 2d 485 (Sup. Ct. 1975) (although Hand-
book not binding, Handbook only restates policy of National Housing Act and HUD
regulations-thus, defense is valid) with Encarnacion Hernandez v. Prudential Mortgage Co.,
553 F.2d 241 (1st Cir. 1977) (because HUD memorandum made clear that Handbook not bind-
ing, no valid defense established by reliance on Handbook) and Government Nat'l Mortgage
Ass'n v. Screen, 85 Misc. 2d 86, 379 N.Y.S.2d 327 (Sup. Ct. 1976) (language of HUD regula-
tions themselves is permissive, not mandatory-no valid defense).
134. See cases cited in note 132 supra.
135. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
136. See generally K. DAvIs, ADMINISTaTIVE LAW AND GOVERNMENT 59-70 (2d ed. 1975).
See also United States v. Winthrop Towers, 628 F.2d 1028, 1035-37 (7th Cir. 1980). In Win-
throp Towers, HUD sought to foreclose a federally insured mortgage because the project was in
default. The defendant mortgagor asserted in defense, inter alia, that inasmuch as HUD had
imposed a moratorium on foreclosures of HUD-held mortgages on projects such as Winthrop
Towers, it was arbitrary and capricious for HUD to seek to foreclose this mortgage. Id. at 1031.
The court, holding that HUD's action was not arbitrary and capricious, id. at 1037, stated that
although HUD's decisions to foreclose must be consistent with national housing objectives and
are therefore reviewable, HUD has very wide discretion in making such decisions. Id. at 1035.
This wide discretion, according to the court, results from the presumption that large commercial
developers possess the sophistication to "make agreements they will be able to live with" and
from the fact that the National Housing Act was intended to benefit poor individuals, not com-
mercial developers. Id. at 1036.
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that HUD has considered all relevant factors before deciding to fore-
close. 137
Bankruptcy Proceedings
When faced with the possibility of foreclosure, owners may consider
another "defensive" measure: seeking relief under bankruptcy law. 13 8  Suc-
cessful reorganization would prevent the HFA from realizing on its collat-
eral 139 and the partnership would retain ownership of the project, avoiding,
at least temporarily, the adverse tax consequences of foreclosure.' 40 Recent
substantive and procedural changes wrought by the Bankruptcy Reform Act
of 1978 141 have affected the availability of this "defense" for typical HFA
projects. 142
During most of the time that the Bankruptcy Act 14 3 was in effect, the
general interpretation of the Chapter XII cram down powers 144 precluded
137. These factors include the feasibility of workout agreements, the use of further subsidiza-
tion and the existence of a viable post-foreclosure plan for operation of the development. See
United States v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 443 F. Supp. 167 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Kent
Farm Co. v. Hills, 417 F. Supp. 297 (D.D.C. 1976). Kent Farm may be distinguishable from
the ordinary situation in that a HUD moratorium on foreclosures was in effect at the time.
138. Generally, the filing of a bankruptcy petition automatically stays actions against the
debtor or the debtor's property; however, filing does not stay HUD from foreclosing a mortgage
insured under the National Housing Act. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(7) (1976). See In re Thornhill Way
I, No. 80-1120 (7th Cir. Dec. 29, 1980) (decided under prior law). Nevertheless, this exemption
generally does not apply to HFA projects because they are not usually insured.
139. In an HFA financed housing project, the collateral would normally be the project itself,
the land on which it is built, and, under the regulatory agreement, rents. See, e.g., IHDA
Form No. LD-5(A), 17.
140. See notes 101-110 and accompanying text supra. Bankruptcy Judge Boy Babbitt com-
mented that "the Chapter Xlls filed these days smack more of preserving tax benefits than
really rehabilitating a true, real estate entrepreneur." In re KRO Assocs., 4 Bankr. Ct. Dec.
462, 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). HUD is considering reducing tax benefits during foreclosure to
eliminate the incentive for owners to protract legal proceedings. Hearings on Multi-Family
Properties, supra note 20, at 87.
141. Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549 (codified in 11 U.S.C. and scattered sections of 2, 7,
12, 15, 17-20, 22, 28, 29, 31, 33, 40-43, 46, 48 and 49 U.SC.). This new bankruptcy code was
generally effective on October 1, 1979, superceding the National Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30
Stat. 544 (1897-98) (as amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 595, 52 Stat. 840 (1938)) (repealed
1979).
142. Two characteristics of typical HFA projects that are important in regard to the availabil-
ity of bankruptcy relief are that (1) their mortgage loans are nonrecourse, i.e., the debtors or
other parties are not liable for amounts owing in excess of what is realized on the collateral, and
(2) their mortgages are uninsured. These characteristics will be assumed in the following discus-
sion. A third characteristic of HFA projects in some states that has been important is that
projects are generally "owned" by a land trust, in which a nonprofit corporation or a limited
partnership owns the beneficial interest. See note 64 supra.
143. Ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1897-98) (as amended by the Chandler Act, ch. 595, 52 Stat. 840
(1938)) (repealed 1979).
144. The Chapter XII authorization for cramming down a plan was provided by § 468(1) of
the old bankruptcy act, formerly at 11 U.S.C. § 868(1), which indicated that as long as a class of
creditors was being adequately protected, a plan could be confirmed even though a two-thirds
majority in amount of that class did not accept the plan. A cram down has been aptly described
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their application to affect the rights of secured creditors, 1 45 such as HFAs.
The cram down powers were ineffective against secured creditors because
the courts would not confirm plans these creditors unanimously opposed. 14 6
The possibility of a debtor cramming down a Chapter XII plan over the
opposition of secured creditors, however, was greatly increased through an
approach adopted in some later cases that focused on the court's evaluation
of whether the plan adequately protected dissenting creditors, rather than
focusing on the views of classes of creditors. 1 4 7  Nevertheless, this newer
approach had not, at the time the new bankruptcy code 148 took effect, com-
pletely displaced the traditional, restrictive interpretations of cram down
powers. 14 9
The new bankruptcy code includes a Chapter 11 150 that consolidates the
reorganization chapters of the old Act and abrogates the old Act's differences
as to debtor qualifications for relief under particular chapters. 151 This con-
solidation ends certain limitations on the availability of real estate reorganiza-
tion arising from debtor qualifications. 1 52
as "a self-evident, vivid term of immediate understanding, perhaps requiring no explanation. It
creates an instant concept of the involuntary administration of bad medicine upon a recalcitrant
victim, the secured creditor who opposed the effect of the reorganization proceedings in the
Bankruptcy Court." In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 66,325, at 76,132 n.16 (N.D. Ga. 1976). For discussions of the history of cram down,
see Gilbert & Massari, Chapter XII "Cram Down," Bad Medicine or Just Desserts?, 52 AMER.
BANKR. L.J. 99, 102-08 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Gilbert & Massari] and Fine, Unjamming the
"Cram Down," 52 AMER. BANKR. L.J. 321, 325-35 (1978). Certain safeguards against cram down
for HUD insured projects that existed under the old Act are not provided for by the new Code.
See Hearings on Multi-Family Properties, supra note 20, at 226.
145. See In re Herweg, 119 F.2d 941 (7th Cir. 1941); Kyser v. MacAdam, 117 F.2d 232 (2d
Cir. 1941).
146. See cases cited in note 145 supra.
147. See In re Pine Gate Assocs. Ltd., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L.REP. (CCH)
66,324 (N.D. Ga. 1976) (holding that a plan adequately protected the senior creditors because
they were to be paid the appraised value of the debt to their class); In re Marietta Cobb
Apartments Co., 14 C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977) (a plan was confirmed even though the only
secured creditor-the mortgagee-opposed confirmation). Regarding this newer, more liberal
approach to the availability of Chapter XII, see Note, From Debtor's Shield to Creditor's
Sword: Cram Down Under the Chandler Act and the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 55 CHI.-KENT
L.REV. 713 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Debtor's Shield] and Gilbert & Massari, supra note 144,
at 112-19.
148. See note 141 supra.
149. See, e.g., In re Georgetown Apartments, 468 F. Supp. 844 (M.D. Fla. 1979); In re
Schwab-Adams Co., 463 F. Supp. 8 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See generally Debtor's Shield, supra note
147, at 731-33.
150. Pub. L. No. 95-598, tit. IV, 92 Stat. 2549 (1978).
151. See generally Ginsberg, Introduction to the Symposium: The Bankruptcy Reform Act of
1978-A Primer, 28 DEPAUL L. REV. 923 (1979).
152. Chapter XII relief could be obtained only by the "legal or equitable owner of real prop-
erty or a chattel real." Old bankruptcy act, § 406(b), formerly at 11 U.S.C. § 806(6). An issue
that arose in states, such as Illinois, where real property commonly was owned in land trusts,
was whether the beneficiary of a land trust was a debtor qualified for Chapter XII relief. In In
re Romano, 426 F. Supp. 1123 (N.D. I11. 1977), the court found that a trust beneficiary was not
a debtor qualified to proceed under Chapter XII. But see In re Gladstone Glen, 628 F.2d 1015
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The code lists ten prerequisites to a successful Chapter 11 cram down. 153
Perhaps the most notable of these requirements is that at least one class of
claims must have accepted the plan. 154  Provided these requirements are
satisfied, the terms of a plan are evaluated as they affect particular types of
creditors. Three additional, reasonably precise guidelines are set forth for
secured creditors that are of greatest significance to mortgagees.1 55 Yet,
mortgagees will have to consider not only the status of secured claims, but
also the status under the plan of unsecured claims and interests. Any
mortgagee of a highly leveraged project subject to a proposed reorganization
plan may be able to exert a significant influence as an unsecured creditor
over the confirmation of a plan. The requirements for a cram down over the
opposition of a class of unsecured creditors might prevent a plan's confirma-
tion. 156 Additionally, a mortgagee must consider the implications of the new
bankruptcy code's provisions in respect to the allowed amount' 5 7 of its claim
(7th Cir. 1980) (rejecting that analysis); Note, May the Beneficiary of an Illinois Land
Trust Proceed under Chapter XII of the Bankruptcy Act?, 10 J. MAR. L.J. 567 (1977) (criticiz-
ing Romano and contending that the beneficiary of an Illinois land trust is a qualified debtor for
purposes of Chapter XII as the owner of an equitable interest in real property).
It is ironic that Illinois land owners were often ineligible for Chapter XII relief because the
drafters of Chapter XII were seeking to address the Chicago pattern of non-corporate real estate
ownership. See In re Pine Gate Assocs., Ltd., [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] BANKR. L. REP.
(CCH) 66,325, at 76,122 (N.D. Ga. 1976); Merrick & Bufithis, Chapter XII -Why Is It?, 52
AM. BANKR. L.J. 213 (1978).
An Illinois land trust is not eligible for relief under the new bankruptcy act. See In re Trea-
sure Island Land Trust, 1 C.B.C.2d 407 (M.D. Fla. 1980).
153. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (1979).
154. Id. § 1129(a)(10). Accordingly, confirmation of a plan over the opposition of a sole cre-
ditor will no longer be possible, as it once was. See In re Marietta Cobb Apartments Co., 14
C.B.C. 503 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
155. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1979). These guidelines do not include all factors that a court
should consider. The basic approach has been described as "a relaxed version of the traditional
absolute priority rule." Klee, All You Ever Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the New
Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 133, 142-43 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Klee].
156. The statutory requirements are set forth at 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(B) (1979). They would
necessitate either a significant cash flow that could be allocated for the unsecured claims or a
loss in equity in the property for the debtor limited partnership. See 5 COLLIER ON BANK-
RUPTCY 1111-15, 1111-16 n.19 (15th ed. 1979).
157. 11 U.S.C. §§ 502, 506 (1979). Because the nonrecourse creditor's deficiency claim is
unenforceable against the debtor and the debtor's property, the deficiency claim can be disal-
lowed in liquidation cases under § 502(b)(1). See Klee, supra note 155, at 140 n.61 & 152 n.117.
In reorganization cases, the nonrecourse creditor's deficiency claim is affected by 11 U.S.C. §
1111(b) (1979). That subsection generally provides that the undersecured nonrecourse creditor
has two claims allowed in reorganization cases-one secured claim and an unsecured claim for
the deficiency. If the creditor's class elects § 1111(b)(2) treatment or the collateral is sold, how-
ever, this unsecured deficiency is lost. Although a creditor electing § 1111(b)(2) treatment loses
an unsecured deficiency claim, its entire allowed claim is treated as though secured. This elec-
tion prevents the secured claim from being cashed out for the collateral's value, with the cre-
ditor remaining unimpaired.
Unfortunately for HFAs, the effect of a § 1111(b)(2) election is clearer for the undersecured
creditor with recourse than the one without recourse. See Kaplan, Nonrecourse Undersecured
Creditors Under New Chapter 11-The Section 1111(b) Election: Already a Need for Change,
53 AM. BANKR. L.J. 269, 270 (1979).
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and the degree, if any, to which the plan impairs that claim. 158 This calcula-
tion must be made because the new code's cram down provisions only pro-
tect the allowed amount of a claim that an impaired creditor has if the claim
is in a class opposed to the plan. 159 Thus, the bankruptcy "defense" could,
in some circumstances, effectively interfere with an HFA's pursuit of its
claims against the collateral or the insolvent owner.
MISAPPLICATION OF FUNDS-VIOLATIONS OF THE
REGULATORY AGREEMENT
All subsidized multi-family projects are nonrecourse financed; that is, the
developer of the project is not personally liable to repay the mortgage in-
debtedness. 160 The developer does, however, have personal liability under
the regulatory agreement. A standard clause in HUD regulatory agreements
provides that developers are personally liable both for property that comes
into their possession that they are not entitled to retain under the regulatory
agreement and for their or their agents' acts in violation of the agreement.' 6 '
Similar language is usually contained in regulatory agreements used by
HFAs. 162 When an owner is a limited partnership, the general partner is
personally liable to the same extent as is the limited partnership. 163 When
158. Three tests are established at 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1979) to determine whether a class of
claims or interests is unimpaired. Cashing out the allowed amount of a claim, which will be
limited to the value of collateral in some circumstances, is recognized in § 1124(3)(A) as leaving
a creditor unimpaired. Note that an unimpaired class of creditors is deemed to have accepted
the plan and a class that is not entitled to payment or compensation under the plan is deemed
not to have accepted it. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1126 (0, (g) (1979).
159. An objecting creditor in a class of which a majority accepted the plan is protected by 11
U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7) (1979).
160. See United States v. Frank, 587 F.2d 924, 926 (8th Cir. 1978); Thompson v. United
States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1078 (8th Cir. 1969).
161. See United States v. Frank, 587 F.2d 924, 926 n.2 (8th Cir. 1978). Paragraph 17 of the
standard HUD regulatory agreement provides that owners
do not assume personal liability for payments due under the note and mortgage, or
for the payments to the reserve for replacements, or for matters not under their
control, provided said Owners shall remain liable under this Agreement only with
respect to the matters hereinafter stated; namely:
(a) for funds or property of the project coming into their hands which, by the
provisions hereof, they are not entitled to retain; and
(b) for their own acts and deeds or acts and deeds of others which they have
authorized in violation of the provisions hereof.
id.
162. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 4(b).
163. Under the Uniform Limited Partnership Act a general partner of a limited partnership
has the same liability as a partner in a general partnership. UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
ACT § 9. A partner of a general partnership is jointly and severally liable for anything charge-
able to the partnership. UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 15. See United States v. Haddon
Haciendas Co., 541 F.2d 777, 780-81 (9th Cir. 1976) (general partners of limited partnership
held personally liable for waste for failure to repair and maintain project premises).
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an owner is a corporation, a corporate officer or director may likewise be
liable for regulatory agreement violations. 16
HFA's Rights Under Regulatory Agreement Against Owner
When funds have been diverted in violation of the regulatory agree-
ment, an HFA typically has several avenues of recourse. Most regulatory
agreements require an annual audit of the project by a certified public ac-
countant.'8 5 If the financial audit has not been conducted, one should be
ordered. In addition, the accountants should be required to prepare a
"compliance audit." In a compliance audit, the auditor determines whether
the funds of the project have been properly expended under the mortgage,
mortgage note, and regulatory agreement. A well prepared compliance audit
may serve as the basis for future action against the owner. It may also pro-
vide facts to negate a project owner's charge of irresponsibility against an
HFA. Relevant facts may also be uncovered by an examination of monthly,
operating statements.
After the HFA receives the compliance audit, its next step is to prepare a
detailed default letter. The default letter should detail the history of the
loan, quote verbatim the violated provisions of the mortgage, mortgage note
and regulatory agreement, list the amounts of the diverted funds, declare
the entire mortgage indebtedness due, and request the owner's view as to
the facts. The default letter should be sent to the general and limited
partners of a limited partnership.
Seven states provide their HFAs with an alternative to either immediate
foreclosure or suit pursuant to a regulatory agreement in the event of a
financial default or an improper diversion of development funds. In these
states, the HFA is authorized by statute to obtain control of the owner entity
by appointing a sufficient number of additional members to constitute a vot-
164. See United States v. Dunn Garden Apartments, Inc., 335 F. Supp. 439, 440-41
(N.D.N.Y. 1971) (corporate officers held liable to United States for failing to assure that rental
receipts subject to assignments of rent clause were properly deposited after United States acquired
mortgage subsequent to default). See generally Davis v. Ben O'Callaghan Co., 139 Ga. App. 22,
227 S.E.2d 837 (1976), modified, 238 Ga. 218, 232 S.E.2d 53 (1977) (corporate director of land
development corporation liable under Georgia statute for improper disposition of corporate as-
sets committed to him); Miller v. Simon, 100 I11. App. 2d 6, 241 N.E.2d 697 (1st Dist. 1968)
(corporate officer liable for tort of corporation in which he participated or which he directed);
McGlynn v. Schultz, 95 N.J. Super. 412, 231 A.2d 386 (1967) (corporate officers and directors
who ratified corporation's conversion of trust funds personally liable); Preston-Thomas Constr.,
Inc. v. Central Leasing Corp., 518 P.2d 1125 (Okla. Ct. App. 1973) (corporate officers liable to
return money corporation held as trustee which had been converted to use of themselves and
corporation); Permian Petroleum Co. v. Barrow, 484 S.W.2d 631 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (corpo-
rate officer liable for corporate debt for tortious conduct in converting property securing indebt-
edness).
165. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 13(e).
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ing majority.166 In the case of a limited partnership, the HFA may appoint
a partner having sole power to manage the partnership affairs.' 67 Similarly,
the HFA may retain the power to cancel any contracts entered into by the
developer and a management agent. To satisfy due process requirements,
however, a written charge with an opportunity to respond may be neces-
sary. 168
After the default letter has been sent, the HFA can negotiate with the
management of the partnership. Assuming that efforts to resolve problems
fail, the HFA can foreclose (if the mortgage delinquency is substantial) or
assert other claims. For instance, a lack of records could produce a claim for
an accounting. 169 The mishandling of funds might furnish a basis for a con-
structive trust claim 170 or an express trust created by the regulatory agree-
ment. 1
7
A likely suit would be an action at law by the HFA seeking judgment
against the owner of the project for misapplication of funds. To understand
the basis for such a suit, an analysis of the concept of "surplus cash" as
defined by the regulatory agreement is necessary. The funds generated by a
project are subject to a mortgage lien. In addition, the regulatory agreement
creates a lien and provides for a series of priorities as to how rental income
is to be spent.172 The leading case discussing surplus cash is Thompson v.
United States,' 73 where the court extensively quoted the regulatory agree-
ment. Surplus cash, in the context of that case, was what remained after
payments for reasonable operating expenses and repairs. Operating expenses
were defined by the court as "limited to expenses paid or incurred in con-
166. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 8-250(cC)(5) (1971); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 h, §§ 302(k)(2), 307.8
(1979); MIci. COMP. LAws § 125.1464 (1976); N.J. REv. STAT. § 55:14J-9(b)(6) (1964); N.Y.
Pasv. Hous. FIN. LAw § 13(15) (McKinney 1976); VA. CODE § 36-55.31(8) (1976); Wis. STAT.
ANN. §§ 234.01(6)(b), (7)(a)(5) (West 1975). The constitutionality of New York's statute has been
upheld. Goldstein v. Urstadt, 74 Misc. 2d 540, 544, 344 N.Y.S.2d 774, 777 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
167. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 67 , §§ 302(k)(2), 307.8 (1979) (providing that eligibility
for an HFA loan requires a limited partnership to include in its agreement a provision granting
the HFA authority to appoint a partner having sole managerial powers in the event of a financial
default). See note 19 supra.
168. See T.A. Moynahan Properties, Inc. v. Lancaster Village Coop., Inc., 496 F.2d 1114
(7th Cir. 1974).
169. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Antioch Theatre Co., 52 II1. App. 3d 122, 131,
367 N.E.2d 247, 255 (1st Dist. 1977) (court will exercise equity jurisdiction to order an ac-
counting when complicated accounts are involved); Lorsch v. Gibraltar Mut. Cas. Co., 127 II1.
App. 2d 350, 356-57, 262 N.E.2d 313, 317 (1st Dist. 1970) (what constitutes such complication
of accounts as will give equity jurisdiction depends in each case upon the particular cir-
cumstances).
170. See, e.g., Ray v. Winter, 39 I11. App. 3d 567, 350 N.E.2d 331 (5th Dist. 1976); Rapp v.
Bowers, 38 I11. App. 3d 668, 348 N.E.2d 529 (2d Dist. 1976).
171. But see Lathrop v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 42 I11. App. 3d 183, 355 N.E.2d 667
(1st Dist. 1976).
172. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 13(g), 17.
173. 408 F.2d 1075 (8th Cir. 1969), aff'g 272 F. Supp. 774 (E.D. Ark. 1967).
1051
DEPAUL LAW REVIEW
nection with the actual operation of the [project] as a going concern." 174
Without surplus cash there can be no distribution from project income.
Even with surplus cash, distributions can be at most for the amount of the
dividend prescribed by statute. Thus, any claim by an HFA against an
owner starts with an analysis of whether the expenditures in question were
operating expenses of the project and ends with a computation of surplus cash.
The only reported decisions involving claims against an owner under a
regulatory agreement have been prosecuted by HUD. The Thompson case
discussed the owner's repayment of loans with project income, payment of
attorneys' fees, and capital expenditures. The court there recognized the
right of the government to a judgment for these unauthorized withdrawals of
development funds. 175  Other unauthorized withdrawals of development
funds have similarly been invalidated by the courts. 176  Furthermore, the
defendants in regulatory agreement actions have not been successful in con-
tending that they are entitled to a profit. Therefore, HUD or an HFA will
not be barred from foreclosure or suit on the regulatory agreement because
the project proved unprofitable. 177  Defenses based on estoppel or waiver
also have been unsuccessful. 178
Three practical problems can arise in suits by HFAs against owners under
regulatory agreements. The first involves accounting information. Since ac-
174. Id. at 1080 (quoting 272 F. Supp. at 787).
175. Id. at 1080-81.
176. See, e.g., United States v. Frank, 587 F.2d 924, 926-28 (8th Cir. 1978), aff'g 447 F.
Supp. 951 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (payment of fees to management company after its contract had
been terminated by HUD is not an operating expense); United States v. Mansion House Center
N. Redevelopment Co., 447 F. Supp. 951, 957 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (payment of legal fees other
than those incurred in day to day operation of project is not operating expense);
United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redevelopment Co., 419 F. Supp. 85, 86-87 (E.D.
Mo. 1976) (amount expended to convert apartment building into motor hotel is not operating
expense); United States v. Gilman, 360 F. Supp. 828, 836-37 (D. Md. 1973) (no surplus cash
exists where project is in default of regulatory agreement).
177. The court in Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1080 (8th Cir. 1969), for
example, stated:
The trial court further correctly noted that: "While the partnership was not re-
quired to advance funds to the project, it is clear that in the absence of such ad-
vances the project would never have been able to get off the ground. The advances
were made by the partnership not to protect the insurance company or the Gov-
ernment or to enhance the security but to promote the interests and expectations of
the partners. The Government never guaranteed the partnership that the Summit
House operation would be successful or profitable, and the Government never as-
sumed the risk of loss should the project fail, except that the Government was
willing to insure a loan which has for its security only the property itself, there
being no personal recourse against the borrower."
Id. (quoting Thompson v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 774, 787 (E.D. Ark. 1967). See also
United States v. Gregory Park, Section II, Inc., 373 F. Supp. 317, 353 (D.N.J. 1974); United
States v. Sherman Gardens Co., 298 F. Supp. 1332, 1334 (D. Nev. 1967).
178. See United States v. Mansion House Center N. Redevelopment Co., 447 F. Supp. 951,
957 (E.D. Mo. 1978).
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counting information is the key to determining what funds are the project's
and whether they have been properly expended, the existence of an
accountant privilege statute could forestall the acquisition of accounting in-
formation. If the privilege is the client's, 179 then the HFA could argue that
it is waived by the regulatory agreement requirement that financial informa-
tion be furnished. 180 A second problem is obtaining tax returns. The Tax
Reform Act of 1976 provides that tax returns and information are confiden-
tial.'18 The taxpayer must consent to their release. The final problem is that
of diversity of citizenship when suit is filed in the federal court. Some courts
take the position that only the citizenship of the general partners is relev-
ant; 182 other courts have considered the citizenship of both the limited and
general partners.' 8 3
HFA's Rights Against Third Parties
An HFA might also consider claims against recipients of funds paid in
violation of a regulatory agreement. Often such recipients are solvent,
whereas the owner is insolvent, his whereabouts unknown, or he is other-
wise judgment proof. A common fact pattern involves loans made by banks
to project owners. The loan is expended for items that are not operating
expenses of the project, and to some extent the loan is repaid. The HFA
may be able to proceed against the bank on three independent legal
theories: improper interference with contractual relations, conversion, and
express or constructive trust.
An HFA might claim improper interference with the contractual relations
of the HFA and the project owner. The claim would arise from the owner's
179. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 5533 (1979); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 326.151 (Vernon
1979); FED. R. EvlD. 501. See also Dorfman v. Rombs, 218 F. Supp. 905 (N.D. I11. 1963) (the
accountant's privilege); Weck v. District Court, 158 Colo. 521, 408 P.2d 987 (1965) (the client's
privilege); Savino v. Lucianao, 92 So. 2d 817 (Fla. 1957) (the client's privilege); Ash v. Reiter,
78 N.M. 194, 429 P.2d 653 (1967) (the accountant's privilege).
180. Cf. Russell v. Missouri Ins. Co., 232 S.W.2d 812 (Mo. App. 1950). See also Reserve
Life Ins. Co. v. Davis Hosp., Inc., 36 F.R.D. 434 (W.D.N.C. 1965) (involving physician-patient
privilege).
181. I.R.C. § 6103.
182. See Colonial Realty Corp. v. Bache & Co., 358 F.2d 178 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 385
U.S. 817 (1966). Cf. Navarro Sav. Ass'n v. Lee, 100 S. Ct. 1779 (1980) (diversity of citizenship is
determined by citizenship of trustees of Massachusetts business trust, not by citizenship of trust
beneficiaries).
183. See, e.g., Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 554 F.2d 1254 (3d
Cir. 1977). See generally Comment, Diversity Jurisdiction and Limited Partnerships, 1977 B.U.
L. REV. 661 (1977); Note, Federal Courts -Diversity of Citizenship Jurisdiction -Limited
Partnerships, 16 DUQUESNE L. REV. 221 (1978); Note, Federal Civil Procedure -Limited
Partners in Plaintiff Partnership Precludes Federal Jurisdiction Based on Diversity of Citizen-
ship, 27 EMORY L.J. 165 (1978) (noting Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan
Ass'n, 554 F.2dl 1254 (3d Cir. 1977)); Note, Diversity of Citizenship-The Citizenship of Lim-
ited Partners Must be Considered in Determining Whether Diversity Exists, 46 CEO. WASH.
L. REV. 657 (1978) (also discussing Carlsberg Resources Corp. v. Cambria Sav. & Loan Ass'n);
Note, Limited Partnerships and Federal Diversity Jurisdiction, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 384 (1978).
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distribution of funds in violation of regulatory agreement provisions.184 The
tort of interference with contracts is based upon one person's intentional and
improper disruption of the performance of a contract between two other
parties by causing one of the parties not to perform.1 5 Intentional interfer-
ence with a contract presupposes knowledge of the contract.' 8 6 Proof of the
essential element of knowledge might be based on the bank's actual knowl-
edge of the agreement. Proof of actual knowledge, of course, would put the
HFA in the best position.' 1 7 Possibly, the involvement of the HFA in
financing the project puts the bank on notice sufficient to cause it to make
an investigation and to make it chargeable with knowledge of the regulatory
agreement.' 88 Assuming the bank did not know that the project was gov-
ernment financed, the filing of the regulatory agreement in the chain of title
184. Regulatory agreements commonly have numerous provisions limiting an owner's right to
disburse funds. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 6, 10, 13, 18. Borrowing money from a
bank and later repaying the indebtedness in whole or in part would violate specifically 10(a),
(b) and (h) of the Illinois Housing Development Authority's regulatory agreement. These para-
graphs prohibit use of funds for other than reasonable operating expenses and incurring any
liability for other than operating expenses unless the Authority agrees. Id.
185. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766 (1965) provides:
One who intentionally and improperly interferes with the performance of a contract
...between another and a third person by inducing or otherwise causing the third
person not to perform the contract, is subject to liability to the other for the
pecuniary loss resulting to the other from the failure of the third person to perform
the contract.
See Harper, Interference with Contractual Relations, 47 Nw. U.L. REV. 873 (1953); Sayre,
Inducing Breach of Contract, 36 HARV. L. REV. 663 (1923).
186. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 766, Comment i (1965) states:
To be subject to liability under the rule stated in this Section, the actor must have
knowledge of the contract with which he is interfering and of the fact that he is
interfering with the performance of the contract. Although the actor's conduct is in
fact the cause of another's failure to perform a contract, the actor does not induce or
otherwise intentionally cause that failure if he has no knowledge of the contract.
187. See Dassance v. Nienhuis, 57 Mich. App. 422, 431-32, 225 N.W.2d 789, 794-95 (1975).
188. "Knowledge" does not necessarily mean actual knowledge. It is sufficient that the parties
who allegedly interfered with a contract "have reason to know" of the existence of the contract.
Mid Continent Tel. Corp. v. Home Tel. Corp., 319 F. Supp. 1176, 1200 (N.D. Miss. 1970). In
Continental Research, Inc. v. Cruttenden, Podesto & Miller, 222 F. Supp. 190 (D. Minn.
1963), the court found that the defendant partnership had knowledge of the existence of a
contract with which it allegedly interfered from the circumstance that memos reflecting the
existence of the contract had been circulated through defendant's office, Id. at 198. The court
quoted a Minnesota case which had stated that "[i]t is enough to show that defendant had
knowledge of facts which, if followed by reasonable inquiry, would have led to a complete
disclosure of the contractual relations and rights of the parties." Id. at 199 (quoting Swaney v.
Crawley, 154 Minn. 263, 265, 191 N.W. 583, 584 (1923)). Accord, Farley v. Kissel Co., 18 Ill.
App. 3d 133, 146, 310 N.E.2d 385, 389 (5th Dist. 1974); Harper, Interference with Contrac-
tual Relations, 47 HARV. L. REv. 873, 880-81 (1953). Cf. Kerr v. DuPree, 35 Ga. App. 122,
123, 132 S.E. 393, 395 (1926) (husband's knowledge of existence of contract not imputed to
wife).
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of a project might be held to give the bank sufficient notice as to constitute
knowledge. 189
Another possible barrier to sustaining a cause of action against the bank
based on interference with contractual relations is establishing that the
bank's interference was improper. Numerous factors have been suggested as
bearing on whether interference is improper, including the nature of the
alleged interferer's conduct, his or her motive and interest, and the nexus
between the conduct and the interference. 190 Some courts have rejected
claims that the making of a loan constituted improper interference with the
performance of a contract. 19 1 Nevertheless, it can be argued that these
cases are distinguishable-for example, none of them involved a secured
lender as the aggrieved party. 192
If an action were maintained by an HFA against a bank, damages would
likely include the amount that the developer had repaid on the loan. 193 It is
also likely, however, that these damages would be reduced by the amount of
any damages recoverable from the developer for breach of the regulatory
189. Cf. Illinois Bell Tel. Co. v. Miner, 11 111. App. 2d 44, 58, 136 N.E.2d 1, 8 (2d Dist.
1956) (in action by telephone company to enjoin defendant from tortious interference with con-
tracts with telephone subscribers, defendant is presumed to know of plaintiff's tariffs, integral
parts of plaintiff's contracts with subscribers, on file with state commerce commission).
190. Section 767 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS (1965) provides as follows:
In determining whether an actor's conduct in intentionally interfering with a con-
tract . . . is improper or not, consideration is given to the following factors:
(a) the nature of the actor's conduct,
(b) the actor's motive,
(c) the interests of the other with which the actor's conduct interferes,
(d) the interests sought to be advanced by the actor,
(e) the social interests in protecting the freedom of action of the actor and the
contractual interests of the other,
() the proximity or remoteness of the actor's conduct to the interference, and
(g) the relations between the parties.
191. See, e.g., Ford v. C.E. Wilson & Co., 129 F.2d 614, 617 (2d Cir. 1942) (held that
where defendant bank made priority secured loan to defendant buyer and loan allegedly inter-
fered with plaintiff seller's chance of being paid by having taken as collateral defendant buyer's
inventory and accounts, seller had no tort claim against bank for interference with contractual
relations); Farley v. Kissel Co., 18 I11. App. 3d 139, 147-48, 310 N.E.2d 385, 390-91 (5th Dist.
1974) (where X had option contract with Y to purchase property for development of apartment
complex and Y entered into agreement to borrow money from Z so that Y himself could develop
the property, Z held not liable in tort to X). See also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 766, Comment
i (1934) ("One does not induce another to commit a breach of contract with a third person ...
when he merely enters into an agreement with the other with knowledge that the other cannot
perform both it and his contract with the third person ....").
192. When a bank knows that an HFA has a secured mortgage on the project, that the
regulatory agreement prohibits further encumbrance of the project, and that any expenditure of
funds by the developer not for operating expenses is in violation of the regulatory agreement, it
can be contended persuasively that the bank's action in extending a loan to the project is suffi-
ciently egregious so as to be the basis of a cause of action.
193. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1) (1965). See generally Note, Damages
Recoverable in an Action for Inducing Breach of Contract, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 232 (1930).
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agreement. 194 Damages recoverable from the bank may also include conse-
quential and punitive damages. 195
The second theory on which a suit against a bank may be based is conver-
sion.'196 An action will lie for the conversion of money if it is a specific sum
capable of identification.1 9 7 The specific funds established by regulatory
agreements and the provisions describing the permissible uses of those funds
should suffice to meet the foregoing requirement. 198  But, for an HFA to
prevail on a conversion theory, it must establish that it had a present right
to control or possess the funds. 199 The provisions of the mortgage and reg-
ulatory agreement must be examined to determine when the HFA obtains
rights to control or possess the funds claimed to have been converted. These
rights could conceivably come into being at three different times depending
upon the agreement between the parties and its interpretation. The first is
when the mortgage is executed-the HFA's right to rents becoming effec-
tive upon recording.200 Such an assignment is called an absolute assignment
in praesenti. The second is when the HFA's right to possession of rents vests
only upon the occurrence of an event, commonly upon default under a
mortgage or mortgage note. 20 ' This type of assignment is called a condition-
ally absolute assignment. The third is when an HFA must either declare a
default and take actual possession of the project or have a receiver appointed
to collect rents for the HFA's benefit in order to perfect its right to posses-
sion of rents.20 2
In the first case, an HFA might maintain a conversion action at any time
after the mortgage is executed and recorded, the bank's possession of any
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 774A(1)(b), Comment a (1965).
195. Id. § 774A(2).
196. Conversion is defined as "an intentional exercise of dominion or control over a chattel
which so seriously interferes with the right of another to control it that the actor may justly be
required to pay the other the full value of the chattel." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
222A(1) (1965).
197. See, e.g., Ellis v. Zuck, 409 F. Supp. 1151 (N.D. Ala. 1976); Shahood v. Cavin, 154
Cal. App, 2d 745, 316 P.2d 700 (1957); Kearney v. Webb, 278 I11. 17, 115 N.E. 844 (1917);
Allen v. Allen, 551 P.2d 459 (Or. 1976); Owens v. Andrews Bank & Trust Co., 220 S.E.2d 116
(S.C. 1975).
198. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 6.
199. See Dickson v. Riebling, 30 Ill. App. 3d 965, 967, 333 N.E.2d 646, 648 (3d Dist. 1975)
("One claiming a conversion must show a tortious conversion of the chattel, a right of property
in it, and a right to immediate possession, absolute and unconditional and not dependent on
some act to be performed."). But cf. Dairy Dep't v. Harvey Cheese, Inc., 278 N.W.2d 137, 144
(N.D. 1979) (allowing recovery in conversion where plaintiff had present interest in property
but right to possession accrued only in the future). Accord, RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 243 (1965).
200. See, e.g., Kinnison v. Guarantee Liquidating Corp., 18 Cal. 2d 256, 115 P.2d 450 (1941)
(recognizing complete transfer of interest in rents at time of assignment, recording, and notifica-
tion of tenants).
201. See, e.g., Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1085 (8th Cir. 1969); United
States v. Pine Hill Apartments, Inc., 261" F.2d 667, 670 (5th Cir. 1958).
202. See, e.g., In re Wakey, 50 F.2d 869, 870 (7th Cir. 1931).
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funds derived from rental payments being wrongful from the time the bank
exercises control over those funds. In the second case, conversion might lie
for any funds received by the bank after occurrence of the specified condi-
tion. In the third case, a bank might be liable for conversion only for funds
paid to it after an HFA perfects its right to the rents.
In order to maintain a conversion action against a bank, an HFA need not
prove that the bank intended to interfere with the HFA's right to possession
or control of the funds, 20 3 but only that the bank intended to exercise
dominion over those funds. 204 It is helpful in establishing the latter if the
aggrieved party, the HFA, has made a demand for return of the funds be-
fore filing suit. 20 5 Without having made such a demand it would be more
difficult, although not impossible, to prove that the bank intended to exer-
cise dominion over the funds.
The third theory upon which suit might be brought against a bank for
money received from a project's income is that the bank held the funds in
trust for the HFA. This theory includes two distinct legal grounds. First,
that the HFA is entitled to an express trust over any funds that the owner
improperly diverted from the project, and, second, that the HFA is entitled
to a constructive trust over any such funds. Under either variation, the HFA
would seek imposition of a constructive trust over the funds received by the
bank.
Regulatory agreements commonly used by HFAs include a provision that
arguably creates an express trust-that project funds not deposited in the
project bank accounts or disbursed in accordance with the regulatory agree-
ment shall be held in trust. 206 Inasmuch as use of the word "trust" is not
necessarily sufficient to demonstrate the intent necessary to establish an ex-
press trust, 20 7 an HFA arguing that an express trust was created would have
to show that the transaction as a whole indicates intent to create such a
trust. 20 8 To accomplish this, an HFA would have to distinguish the relation-
203. See, e.g., Aeroglide Corp. v. Zeh, 301 F.2d 420, 422 (2d Cir. 1962); Markel v. Trans-
america Title Ins. Co., 103 Ariz. 353, 360, 442 P.2d 97, 104, cert. denied, 393 U.S. 999 (1968).
See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 224, Comment c (1965).
204. See, e.g., Quaker Oats Co. v. McKibben, 230 F.2d 652, 654 (9th Cir. 1956). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 222A, 224, 224, Comment c (1965).
205. The Restatement states that conversion may be committed by, inter alia, "refusing to
surrender a chattel . RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 223(g) (1965). See also id.
§ 237-241.
206. See, e.g., IHDA Form No. LD-5(A), 101(3) ("Any distribution of funds of the De-
velopment, which the party receiving such funds is not entitled to retain hereunder, shall be
held in trust separate and apart from any other funds.").
207. See, e.g., La Throp v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 I11. 2d 375, 381, 370 N.E.2d
188, 191 (1977); Price v. State, 79 Ill. App. 3d 143, 148, 398 N.E.2d 365, 370-71 (1st Dist.
1979).
208. See Koppers Co. v. Carling & Langlois, 594 F.2d 1094, 1099 (6th Cir. 1979); Craig
Food Indus., Inc. v. Taco Time Int'l, Inc., 469 F. Supp. 516, 527 (D. Utah 1979); La Throp v.
Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 I11. 2d 375, 381, 370 N.E.2d 188, 191 (1977); Price v. State,
79 I11. App. 3d 143, 148, 398 N.E.2d 365, 370-71 (1st Dist. 1979). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TRUSTS §§ 23, 24 (1959).
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ship created by the regulatory agreement from a simple debtor-creditor rela-
tionship.2 0 9 The mortgagor-mortgagee relationship is itself a debtor-creditor
and not a trust relationship. 210 The two requirements in regulatory agree-
ments that project funds are to be kept in segregated accounts and are sub-
ject to numerous other restrictions furnish reasons for distinguishing the
HFA-owner relationship from the usual mortgagor-mortgagee relation-
ship. 211 A further potential impediment to establishing an express trust is
that the corpus of the trust does not exist when the HFA and the owner
enter into the regulatory agreement.2 12
Establishing that a court should impose a constructive trust over funds
that the owner diverted is also not free from difficulty. A constructive trust
can be imposed when the property at issue was acquired by fraud or breach
of a fiduciary relationship.2 13 Establishing fraud would be difficult because
the HFA would probably have to show that the owner committed a fraud
when acquiring the funds or that its activities in respect to the project in
general were fraudulent. 2 14 The mortgagor-mortgagee relationship itself is
generally not considered fiduciary in nature. 2 15 A fiduciary relationship may
be established, however, where a mortgage agreement contains definite re-
strictions on the mortgagee's use of particular funds.2 16
Provided that the HFA successfully contends that the project funds di-
verted by the owner were subject to either an express or constructive trust,
it can seek imposition of a constructive trust over the funds transferred to
209. See generally SCOTT ON TRUSTS §§ 12 to 12.12 (3d ed. 1967). See also Carlson, Inc. v.
Commercial Discount Corp., 382 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1967); Lords, Inc. v. Malex, 356 F.2d 456
(7th Cir. 1965).
210. Courts have considered these relationships when mortgagors asserted that their advance
payments to mortgagees of such items as taxes and insurance premiums were trust funds on
which interest should be paid. These courts generally have rejected these assertions, even when
the mortgage expressly provided that such funds were to be held in trust. See, e.g., La Throp
v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 111. 2d 375, 370 N.E.2d 188 (1977); Sears v. First Fed. Sav.
& Loan Ass'n, 1 Il. App. 3d 621, 275 N.E.2d 300 (1st Dist. 1971).
211. Cf. Elliott v. Bumb, 356 F.2d 749 (9th Cir. 1966) (where seller of money orders held
funds received in separate account pursuant to agreement that such funds should be held in
trust for the issuer of the money orders, court held a valid trust created); Janes v. First Fed.
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 57 III. 2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605 (1974) (where defendant savings and loan
association loaned plaintiffs money to purchase real estate and defendant later received a 10%
rebate from a title insurance company, defendant held rebate upon a constructive trust for
plaintiffs).
212. Courts are divided on whether a trust will automatically arise when trust property is
later acquired. Annot., 3 A.L.R.3d 1416 (1965). Although an existing contract right can be the
subject of an express trust, it is questionable whether an owner has a contract right to rents
before leasing dwelling units.
213. G. BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES § 471 (2d ed. 1978).
214. See, e.g., Carey Elec. Contracting, Inc. v. First Nat'l Bank, 74 I11. App. 3d 233, 392
N.E.2d 759 (2d Dist. 1976).
215. La Throp v. Bell Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 68 11. 2d 375, 391, 370 NE.2d 188, 198-99
(1977).
216. See Janes v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 57 II1. 2d 398, 312 N.E.2d 605 (1974).
Regulatory agreement restrictions on the owner's disbursement of funds arguably support a
finding of a fiduciary relationship between an HFA and an owner.
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the bank. Only if the bank qualifies as a bona fide purchaser can it take the
property free of the trust.2 17 Whether the bank so qualifies will depend
upon a variety of circumstances. These include information known by, or
possibly available to, the bank that the funds were subject to an express or
constructive trust when held by the owner 2I s and whether the creditor bank
was also the depository of project accounts. 219
CONCLUSION
The multi-family rental subsidized housing industry is a creature of federal
subsidies. These subsidies can take the form of mortgage interest payments,
rent supplements or rent subsidies. To entice investors to invest in sub-
sidized housing projects, federal income tax deductions, which are indirect
subsidies, are also provided. Another significant indirect subsidy is the tax-
exempt status of HFA bonds.
There is, however, another hidden subsidy. It is the use of taxpayer dol-
lars to rescue defaulted projects. According to one official report, seventy-
one percent of all projects with insured mortgages assigned to HUD are in
financial default. 22 0 This figure is astounding. The loss of principal and in-
terest due to nonpayment or deferral and repayment in cheaper, inflated
dollars is yet another burden on the American taxpayer. HFAs are not, by
contrast, plagued with a delinquency rate that approaches what HUD has
experienced under some programs, possibly because they have only been in
existence since 1960. Alternatively, HFA underwriting and management
standards could be more financially responsible than HUD's.
In any case, when faced with a defaulting project, an HFA's priority will
be to cure the default by procuring funds from the general and limited
partners of the project and from third parties. The general partner obtained
a highly leveraged, subsidized loan, advancing only one to two percent cash
equity, and usually made a handsome profit from fees paid by the partner-
ship for building the project and selling interests in it to limited partners. In
a default, the general partner should be required to repay all project funds
217. See A. ScoT'r, THE LAW OF TRUSTS §§ 283, 284, 474 (1967). A bona fide purchaser is
one taking property for value and without notice of the breach of trust or of other fiduciary
relationship. Id. § 474.
218. Depending on the mode of payment to the bank, negotiable instrument law may govern
the bank's liability for receipt of trust funds. Generally, a bank will be charged with notice of
funds being impressed with a trust only if it had actual knowledge of that fact or acted in bad
faith. Yoakum County Water Control & Improvement Dist. No. 2 v. First State Bank, 433
S.W.2d 200, 212 (Tex. Civ. App. 1968); RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 174 (1935). A bank
may, however, have a duty of inquiry regarding "suspicious circumstances." Oscar Gruss & Son
v. First State Bank, 582 F.2d 424, 431 (7th Cir. 1978).
219. A bank receiving repayments of loans when it is the depository of project accounts is
more likely to be charged with notice than is a bank that does not also hold project accounts.
Bonhiver v. State Bank, 29 Ill. App. 3d 794, 805-06, 331 N.E.2d 390, 399-400 (1st Dist. 1975);
Westerly Community Credit Union v. Industrial Nat'l Bank, 103 R.I. 662, 671-72, 240 A.2d
586, 591-92 (1968).
220. Hearings on Multi-Family Properties, supra note 20, at 17, 257.
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used in violation of the regulatory agreement. Even if there were no viola-
tions of the regulatory agreement, the general partner might provide addi-
tional funds to prevent a mortgage foreclosure that could cause such adverse
consequences for the general partner as loss of investment, loss of reputation
as a syndicator, debarment by the HFA or HUD, removal as general
partner pursuant to statute, possible suits by limited partners for securities
law violations, and income tax liabilities.
Limited partners faced with a mortgage foreclosure will usually find it
desirable to provide additional funds as well. A foreclosure causes an in-
voluntary sale of the project and a recapture of accelerated depreciation.
Both results will usually give rise to substantial federal income tax liabilities.
This tax consideration is far more important than the loss of a limited part-
ner's investment in the project. To obviate federal tax liabilities, a limited
partner should make an additional capital contribution or allow a resyndica-
tion of the partnership to generate additional funds for investment.
An HFA should explore all means of raising additional funds before bring-
ing suit under the regulatory agreement or initiating foreclosure, including
pursuit of third parties who received project funds. This procedure protects
its assets and reserves, and also prevents unnecessary requests to the state
legislature for taxpayer monies. HUD, too, could adopt a similar, more ag-
gressive policy of requiring owners of projects to cure defaults, rather than
having the taxpayers bear the burden of default. In these ways, federally
subsidized multi-family housing can retain both its financial integrity and its
significant position in today's housing market.
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